Motions to Withdraw the Reference - An Empirical Study by Bartell, Laura B.
Wayne State University 
Law Faculty Research Publications Law School 
1-1-2015 
Motions to Withdraw the Reference - An Empirical Study 
Laura B. Bartell 
Wayne State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/lawfrp 
 Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Laura B. Bartell, Motions to Withdraw the Reference - An Empirical Study, 89 Am. Bankr. L.J. 397, 454 
(2015) 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at DigitalCommons@WayneState. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Research Publications by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@WayneState. 
Motions to Withdraw the Reference -
An Empirical Study
by
Laura B. Bartell*
One of the key provisions of the Judicial Code enacted by the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 19841 to address the constitu-
tional infirmities of the jurisdictional provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 19782 was 28 U.S.C. § 157(d). That section empowers, or in certain
circumstances requires, the Article III federal district court to "withdraw, in
whole or in part, any case or proceeding referred" to the bankruptcy court
under 28 U.S.C. § 157.
In this article I begin by reviewing the history of the relationship be-
tween the Article III district courts and the bankruptcy courts. I also look at
the case law establishing when a district court must or may withdraw the
reference. Finally, I describe my empirical study of all cases in which motions
to withdraw the reference were made and decided during 2013. I found that
many more such motions were made and granted than I anticipated, and that
the likelihood of success on a motion to withdraw depends in large measure
on whether it is opposed, whether it is based on a request for a jury trial, and
where it is brought.
I. NORTHERN PIPELINE, THE 1984 AMENDMENTS, AND
STERN V. MARSHALL
In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,3 the
Supreme Court found that the broad jurisdictional grant to bankruptcy
courts set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b)4 violated Article III of the United
States Constitution. The appellants had urged that the jurisdictional scheme
could be upheld either because the bankruptcy courts were Article I courts
free from the constraints of Article III, or because they were mere "adjuncts"
to the Article III district courts and were thus not improperly usurping Arti-
*Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. My thanks to Beth Applebaum for her
assistance on this article.
'Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984) (the "1984 Amendments").
'Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
3458 U.S. 50 (1982).
4At the time, 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) gave bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over all bankruptcy cases and
all 'civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11."
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cle III authority. In an opinion by Justice Brennan, a four-judge plurality of
the Court rejected both bases urged by the appellants for supporting the
constitutionality of the jurisdictional provisions.
First, the plurality concluded that the bankruptcy courts were not Arti-
cle I "legislative" courts, nor could the precedents for the creation of such
courts (territorial courts, the courts of the District of Columbia, courts-mar-
tial, and administrative agencies adjudicating cases involving "public rights")
support the broad grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts.5 "Public
rights" was a concept the plurality declined to define, but the plurality did
state that they must "at a minimum arise 'between the government and
others,"' 6 and that the "adjudication of state-created private rights, such as
the right to recover contract damages that is at issue in this case" obviously
does not qualify as a public right.7 The plurality declined to adopt a new
rationale for the creation of non-Article III bankruptcy courts based on the
Bankruptcy Clause in the United States Constitution,8 noting that such a
holding would permit Congress, acting pursuant to its Article I powers, to
"create courts free of Art. III' s requirements whenever it finds that course
expedient."9
Second, the plurality rejected the contention that the bankruptcy courts
were mere "adjuncts" of the district court whose authority could be analo-
gized to that of administrative agencies and magistrates acting in that capac-
ity.10 The key issue, according to the plurality, was whether the Article III
district court retained "'the essential attributes of the judicial power.'""
While recognizing that "Congress possesses broad discretion to assign
factfinding functions to an adjunct created to aid in the adjudication of con-
gressionally created statutory rights," the plurality held that Congress does
sNorthern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 63-68. The plurality noted that congressional control over territories
and the District of Columbia rested on the absence of a state government in these geographical areas.
Article IV, thus, empowers Congress to exercise the "complete power of government" in these locations.
Id. at 64-65. Congress has the authority to provide for courts-martial under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 14
of the Constitution which gives Congress the power to "make Rules for the Government and Regulation
of the land and naval Forces." Id. at 66. Although the plurality noted that "[t]he distinction between
public rights and private rights has not been definitively explained in our precedents," id. at 69, it con-
cluded that the causes of action for breach of contract, breach of warranty, misrepresentation, duress, and
coercion, which were at issue in Northern Pipeline, involved "the adjudication of state-created private
rights," rather than "the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations." Id. at 71. Thus, bankruptcy court
jurisdiction could not be justified by cases involving adjudication of public rights by legislative courts or
administrative agencies.
6Id. at 69 (quoting Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929).
7Id. at 71.
'U.S. CONsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. 4 gives Congress the power to establish "uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States."
'Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 73.
'old. at 78-82.
"Id. at 77 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932)).
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not have the same degree of discretion with respect to rights not created by
it.1 2 Comparing the bankruptcy court with the administrative agency chal-
lenged in Crowell v. Benson" and the U.S. magistrates considered in United
States v. Raddatz,14 the plurality concluded that the bankruptcy courts were
exercising far greater powers than those constitutional adjuncts and therefore
the grant of such powers violated Article III.15
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor, concurred in the judgment
and agreed with the plurality that the bankruptcy courts were not "adjuncts"
of an Article III court.1 6 However, he declined to endorse the plurality's
analysis of Congress's Article I powers, especially with respect to the "public
rights" doctrine, concluding only that, whatever the scope of that doctrine, it
could not support adjudication of the state law causes of action involved in
the case at hand.' 7
The Supreme Court stayed the effective date of its Northern Pipeline
judgment first to October 4, 1982,18 and then to December 24, 1982,19 in
order to allow Congress time to amend the statutes without causing disrup-
tion to the ongoing operation of the bankruptcy system. When Congress
failed to act, the Judicial Conference of the United States sent to all judicial
councils of the circuits a draft "Emergency Rule" for adoption by the district
courts to enable the bankruptcy court system to continue to operate in a way
consistent with the limits imposed by Northern Pipeline.20 The Emergency
Rule permitted (but did not require) the district courts to refer to the bank-
ruptcy courts "all cases under title 11 and all civil proceedings arising under
title 11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11," but permitted the
district court to withdraw the reference at any time.2 1 The Emergency Rule
gave the bankruptcy courts authority to perform "all acts and duties neces-
sary" to handle referred cases and proceedings, but it barred them from,
among other things, conducting jury trials.2 2 In "related proceedings,"23 the
bankruptcy court could not, without the consent of the parties, enter a judg-
ment or dispositive order, but could only submit findings and a proposed
12Id at 81.
"285 U.S. 22 (1932).
14447 U.S. 667 (1980).
"Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 86-87.
"Id. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
"
7 Id.
"Id. at 88.
19459 U.S. 813 (1982).
2'The Emergency Rule adopted by the district courts in the Sixth Circuit is set out in full as an
appendix to White Motor Corp. v. Citibank N.A., 704 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1983).
21Id. at 265-66.
22Id. at 266.
"Id. (defining "related proceedings" as "those civil proceedings that, in the absence of a petition in
bankruptcy, could have been brought in a district court or a state court").
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judgment or order to the district court.2 4 In other proceedings, the bank-
ruptcy court's orders and judgments were final, subject to de novo review by
the district court.25
In the 1984 Amendments, Congress adopted, with some modifications,
the jurisdictional structure of the Emergency Rule. Congress amended Title
28 to vest "original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11" and
"original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under
title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11" in the district
courts. 2 6 This amendment effectively repealed the broad grant of jurisdiction
to the bankruptcy courts previously contained in Title 28.
The amended provisions of the Judicial Code designated bankruptcy
judges as a "unit of the district court to be known as the bankruptcy court
for that district," 2 7 to serve as "judicial officers of the United States district
court established under Article III of the Constitution." 2 8 They permitted
the district courts to refer "any or all cases under title 11 and any or all
proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title
11" to the bankruptcy judges.2 9 The concept of "referral" was a familiar one
to Congress: a similar approach had been used in the Federal Magistrates
Act.30 Under that act, a district court could designate a magistrate judge to
hear and determine nondispositive pretrial matters,3 ' and to conduct hearings
(but not enter a final judgment unless the parties consented 32) in dispositive
pretrial matters.33 A magistrate judge could make proposed findings and rec-
ommendations in dispositive pretrial matters to which any party could ob-
ject, and the district court would make a de novo determination of those
matters.34
By analogy to the Federal Magistrates Act, the new statutory provisions
for bankruptcy cases allowed bankruptcy judges to "hear and determine" all
cases and "core proceedings"35 arising under title 11 or arising in a case under
241d.
"Id. at 266-67.
2628 U.S.C. § 1334(a) & (b). Amended § 1334 replaced 28 U.S.C. § 1471 which granted the same
jurisdiction to the district courts but provided that the bankruptcy courts could exercise all jurisdiction
conferred on the district courts.
2728 U.S.C. § 151.
28 d. § 152(a)(1).
291d. § 157(a).
3028 U.S.C. § 631-39.
3
"ld. § 636(b)(1)(A).
"Id. § 636(c).
33Id. § 636(b)(1)(B).
341d. § 636(b)(1).
35
"Core proceedings" were defined as follows:
"Core proceedings include, but are not limited to-
(A) matters concerning the administration of the estate;
(Vol. 89
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title 11.6 For a proceeding that is not a "core proceeding" but that is "other-
wise related to a case under title 11," the bankruptcy court could only "hear"
the proceeding and submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to
the district court,37 unless the parties consented.38 The district court would
then enter any final judgment "after considering the bankruptcy judge's pro-
posed findings and conclusions and after reviewing de novo those matters to
which any party has timely and specifically objected."39 The treatment of
related proceedings under the new provisions was clearly intended to confine
the role of the bankruptcy judge to that of a permitted "adjunct" under the
analysis of the Northern Pipeline plurality, by leaving the "essential attributes
of judicial power" with the Article III district court judge.
The district court was required to withdraw the reference to the bank-
ruptcy court of any proceeding "if the court determines that resolution of the
proceeding requires consideration of both title 11 and other laws of the
United States regulating organizations or activities affecting interstate com-
merce." 40 The district could was permitted to withdraw the reference to the
(B) allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or exemptions from prop-
erty of the estate, and estimation of claims or interest for the purpose of confirming
a plan under chapter 11, 12, or 13 of title 11 but not the liquidation or estimation of
contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort or wrongful death claims against the
estate for purposes of distribution in a case under title 11;
(C) counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate;
(D) orders in respect to obtaining credit;
(E) orders to turn over property of the estate;
(F) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences;
(G) motions to terminate, annul, or modify the automatic stay;
(H) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances;
(I) determinations as to the dischargeability of particular debts;
(J) objections to discharges;
(K) determinations of the validity, extent, or priority of liens;
(L) confirmations of plans;
(M) orders approving the use or lease of property, including the use of cash
collateral;
(N) orders approving the sale of property other than property resulting from claims
brought by the estate against persons who have not filed claims against the estate;
and
(0) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate or the
adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security holder relationship, except
personal injury tort or wrongful death claims."
Id. § 157(b)(2). The list was expanded by amendments included in the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 to add clause (P), the "recognition of foreign proceedings and other
matters under chapter 15 of title 11." Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 802(c)(1), 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
36Id. § 157(b)(2).
"Id. § 157(c)(1).
"Id. § 157(c)(2).
'Id. § 157(c)(1).
4
'1d. § 157(d) (second sentence). This is familiarly known as "mandatory withdrawal of the reference."
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bankruptcy court, in whole or in part, "for cause shown."4' The bankruptcy
court was precluded from conducting a jury trial unless "specially designated
to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court and with the express con-
sent of all the parties."42
The jurisdictional scheme enacted by the 1984 Amendments survived
without major challenge 43 until the Supreme Court decision in Stern v. Mar-
shall.44 The constitutional issue in Stern v. Marshall involved a "counter-
claim[ ] by the estate against a person filing a proof of claim against the
estate," which is a "core" proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C). The
Supreme Court held that, although the counterclaim was indeed a "core" pro-
ceeding and therefore the bankruptcy court had statutory authority to "hear
and determine" the matter, Congress had violated Article III of the U.S. Con-
stitution by conferring such authority on a non-Article III judge.
First, the Court concluded that the counterclaim did not constitute a
matter of "public rights" that can be adjudicated by a non-Article III judge.45
No matter what formulation one might employ to define the term "public
rights," a fraudulent conveyance action was a state common law claim be-
tween two private parties, and could not be considered a matter of "public
rights."4 6 The fact that the defendant filed a proof of claim did not matter;
the bankruptcy court could not constitutionally resolve the counterclaim un-
less it "would necessarily be resolved in the claims allowance process."47
The Court also rejected the contention that the bankruptcy judge was
acting as an "adjunct" of the Article III district court when it decided the
counterclaim. Noting that the bankruptcy judge had the power to enter a
4 1Id. § 157(d) (first sentence). This is known as "permissive withdrawal of the reference."
4 2 d. § 157(e).
4 3 In Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989), the Supreme Court held that when defend-
ants in a fraudulent conveyance action brought by the trustee under II U.S.C. § 548 had not filed a proof
of claim in the bankruptcy case, they retained a right to a trial by jury under the Seventh Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution. The Court strongly hinted, without holding, that a fraudulent conveyance action
against someone who had not filed a proof of claim was a type of action which had to be determined by an
Article III court, despite its label as "core" under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(H). Id. at 53 (stating that the
question of whether the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial "requires the same answer as the ques-
tion whether Article III allows Congress to assign adjudication of that cause of action to a non-Article III
tribunal."). This could be seen as a suggestion that § 157(b)(1) was unconstitutional with respect to
claims described in § 157(b)(2)(H) when the target of the action had not filed a proof of claim. However,
in Langenkamp v. CuIp, 498 U.S. 42 (1990), the Court held that a litigant who had filed a proof of claim
had no right to a jury trial in a preference action because the claim and the preference action "become
integral to the restructuring of the debtor-creditor relationship through the bankruptcy court's equity
jurisdiction." Id. at 44 (emphasis in original). After Granfinanciera and Langenkamp, it seemed that, so
long as a core proceeding was brought against someone who had filed a claim in the bankruptcy case, the
bankruptcy court had the constitutional power to hear and determine the matter.
44131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
4sId. at 2611.
46Id. at 2614.
47d. at 2618.
(Vol. 89402
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final judgment, subject to review only if the aggrieved party appeals, the
Court concluded that the bankruptcy courts exercise "the essential attrib-
utes of judicial power [that] are reserved to Article III courts.'"48
Dismissing the contention that restrictions on the ability of a bankruptcy
judge to hear and determine compulsory counterclaims would be costly and
create delays in the bankruptcy system, the Court emphasized that bank-
ruptcy law already requires the district court to conduct a de novo review
and enter final judgment on any noncore matters, and that the district court
may withdraw the reference from the bankruptcy court under § 157(d).
Therefore, the Court stated, its decision does not "meaningfully change[ ] the
division of labor in the current statute."49
II. THE AFTERMATH OF STERN AND EXECUTIVE BENEFITS
After Stern, three major issues remained unsettled. The first was
whether the Court's decision with respect to core matters under 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(b)(2)(C) (counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims
against the estate) was also applicable to other types of core matters. The
second was whether, if a bankruptcy court could not constitutionally hear
and determine a core matter, it had the statutory power to hear the core
matter as if it were a noncore matter under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) and submit
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court. The
final issue was whether the bankruptcy court can enter a final judgment in a
Stern-type core proceeding with the consent of the litigants (as the statute
provides with respect to noncore proceedings in 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2)).
With respect to most core proceedings listed in § 157(b)(2), other than
§ 157(b)(2)(C),5 0 bankruptcy courts have had little trouble dismissing objec-
tions to their authority based on Stern. For example, courts have held that
they may render final decisions with respect to matters concerning adminis-
tration of the bankruptcy estate, § 157(b)(2)(A); 5 allowance or disallowance
of claims, § 157(b)(2)(B);S 2 orders with respect to obtaining credit,
45Id. at 2619 (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986)).
4
'Id. at 2620.
5 See, e.g., Gecker v. Flynn (In re Emerald Casino, Inc.), 467 BR. 128, 132-33 (N.D. Ill. 2012); In re
Olde Prairie Block Owner, LLC, 457 BR. 692, 698-99 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011); Stoebner v. PNY Technolo-
gies, Inc. (In re Polaroid Corp.), 451 B.R. 493, 496 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2011).
51See, e.g., Albert v. Site Management, Inc., 506 B.R. 453, 458-459 (D. Md. 2014); In re CorrLine Int'l,
LLC, 516 B.R. 106, 136-37 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2014); In re Thongta, 480 B.R. 317, 318-19 (Bankr. E.D.
Wis. 2012); Burns v. Dennis (In re Southeastern Materials, Inc.), 467 BR. 337, 358 (Bankr. M.D.N.C.
2012); West v. Davis (In re Davis), No. 11-10879, 2012 WL 3292944 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Aug. 10, 2012);
McClelland v. Grubb & Ellis Valuation & Advisory Grp. (In re McClelland), 460 B.R. 397, 407 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2011); Husky Int'l Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz (In re Ritz), 459 B.R. 623, 631 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
2011).
"See, e.g., In re Woods, 517 B.R. 106, 115-16 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014); In re Smith, No. 12-10142, 2013
WL 665991, at *1 (Bankr. D. Vt. Feb. 22, 2013); Souther v. Bacon County Health Servs., Inc. (In re
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§ 157(b)(2)(D);53 turnover orders, § 157(b)(2)(E);S4 preference actions under
§ 547, § 157(b)(2)(F),55 motions regarding the automatic stay,§ 157(b)(2)(G);56 disputes over dischargeability of claims, § 157(b)(2)(I);57
objections to discharge, § 157(b)(2)(J);s 8 disputes over liens, § 157(b)(2)(K);59
Matrix Imaging Serys., Inc.), 479 BR. 182, 189-90 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2012); Yellow Sign, Inc. v. Freeway
Foods, Inc. (In re Freeway Foods of Greensboro, Inc.), 466 B.R. 750, 769, 771-72 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2012);
In re Borin, 461 BR. 719, 720 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011).
"See, e.g., Int'l Tobacco Partners, Ltd., v. Ohio (In re Int'l Tobacco Partners, Ltd.), 462 BR. 378, 391-
92 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011); see generally Alec P. Ostrow, Let Us Sternly Marshal the Case for Mostly
Constitutional Core jurisdiction, 2012 NORTON ANN. SuRv. BANKR. LAw 2 at n. 132 (2012).
"See, e.g., Shaia v. Taylor (In re Connelly), 476 BR. 223, 230 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2012); Southeastern
Materials, 467 B.R. at 353-57; In re Larkins, No. 11-18295, 2012 WL 1378470, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
Apr. 19, 2012); In re Miller, No. 10-15891, 2011 WL 3741846, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Aug. 24, 2011);
Int'l Tobacco Partners, 462 B.R. at 392.
ssSee, e.g, Martino v. Miszkowicz (In re Miszkowicz), 513 B.R. 553, 556-57 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014);
Shurn v. Gilbert (In re Gulf Coast Glass & Erection Co.), 484 B.R. 685, 692 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013); KHI
Liquidation Trust v. Wisenbaker Builder Sers., Inc. (In re Kimball Hill, Inc.), 480 B.R. 894, 905-06
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2012); West v. Freedom Med., Inc. (In re Apex Long Term Acute Care-Katy, L.P.), 465
B.R. 452, 468 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011); but see Pryor v, Tromba, No. 13-CV-676, 2014 WL 1355623, at *7
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2014); Carroll v. Raynor (In re Innovative Communication Corp.), No. 3-07-30012, 2013
WL 26313744, at *5 (D.V.I. June 12, 2013); Penson Fin. Servs. v. O'Connell (In re Arbco Capital Mgmt.,
LLP), 479 B.R. 254, 265-66 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); In re Am. Hous. Found., 469 B.R. 257 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
2012) (stating that preference claims, when coupled with fraudulent transfer claims, are beyond constitu-
tional authority of bankruptcy courts to decide). See also Murphy v. Felice (In re Felice), 480 B.R. 401,
428 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012) (holding that the bankruptcy court has constitutional authority to enter final
judgment on a claim to recover an unauthorized postpetition transfer under § 549).
s'See, e.g., In re Medlar, No. 11-17909, 2013 WL 6152324, at *2 n.1 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio. Nov. 22,
2013); Meoli v. Huntington Nat'l Bank (In re Teleservices Grp., Inc.), 456 B.R. 318, 335-36 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 2012); In re Ramsey, No. 10-16609, 2011 WL 2680575, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio July 7, 2011).
"See, e.g., H. Brooks & Co. v. Yerges (In re Yerges), 512 B.R. 916, 918 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2014); Karr
Plex, Ltd. v. Hollier (In re Hollier), No. 09-51789, 2014 WL 4198907, at *1 (Bankr. W.D. La. Aug. 22,
2014); Gilley v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (In re Gilley), No. 12-11443, 2013 WL 690818, at *2 (Bankr.
M.D.N.C. Feb. 26, 2013); Husky Int'l Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz (In re Ritz), 459 B.R. 623, 631 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 2011); Gila Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Lobera (In re Lobera), No. 7-10-13203-SL, 2012 WL 3263730, at *7-8
(Bankr. D. N.M. Aug. 9, 2012); First Horizon Home Loan Corp. v. Apostle (In re Apostle), 467 BR. 433,
436 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2012); Groves v. Duke (In re Duke), No. 11-51521, 2012 WL 4506662, at *2
(Bankr. M.D.N.C. Sept. 28, 2012); Ramsey, 2011 WL 2680575, at *1.
ssSee, e.g., Hollier, 2014 WL 4198907, at *1; Wan Ho Indus.. Co., v. Hemken (In re Hemken), 513 B.R.
344, 349 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2014).
"See, e.g., DeGiacomo v. Traverse (In re Traverse), 485 B.R. 815, 818-19 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2013), revd
on other grounds, 753 F.3d 19 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 459 (2014); Res. Funding, Inc. v. Pac. Cont'l
Bank (In re Washington Coast I, L.L.C.), 485 B.R. 393, 405-06 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012); GMAC Mortgage,
LLC v. Orcutt, 506 B.R. 52, 60-64 (D. Vt. 2014); Green Tree Servicing LLC v. Fleishhauer (In re Staggs),
No. 12-60517-13, 2014 WL 1796664, at *1 (Bankr. D. Mont. May 6, 2014); Albracht v. Hamilton State
Bank (In re Albracht), 505 B.R. 347 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2013); Gonzales v. La Vista Homeowners' Ass'n (In
re Potter), No. 7-05-14071-TRC, 2013 WL 2897036, at *1-2 (Bankr. D.N.M. June 12, 2013); Fleury v.
Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 11-26987-E-13, 2011 WL 4851141, at *1-2 (Bankr. E.D Cal. Oct. 6,
2011); Int'l Tobacco Partners, Ltd., v. Ohio (In re Int'l Tobacco Partners, Ltd.), 462 B.R. 378, 391-92
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011); Tibble v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Hudson), 455 B.R. 648 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 2011).
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plan confirmation disputes, § 157(b)(2)(L);60 orders regarding the sale, lease,
or use of property, § 157(b)(2)(M) and (N); 6 1 and other proceedings affecting
the liquidation of the assets of the estate or the adjustment of the debtor-
creditor relationship, § 157(b)(2)(0). 62  (There are as of yet no published
cases discussing the impact of Stern on chapter 15 matters, § 157(b)(2)(P)).
One type of core proceeding has been more problematic. Courts have
been divided about whether fraudulent conveyance proceedings, which are
statutorily labeled as "core" under § 157(b)(2)(H), can be heard and deter-
mined by a non-Article III bankruptcy court. Most courts have concluded
that they cannot, whether the claims are brought under 11 U.S.C. § 548 or
under state law by virtue of 11 U.S.C. § 544.63
'See, e.g., In re Batista-Saneches, 505 B.R. 222, 224 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014); In re Scott, No. 13-12135,
2013 WL 5567319, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Oct. 9, 2013); In re Safety Harbor Resort & Spa, 456 B.R
703, 716 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011).
"See, e.g., Traverse, 485 B.R. at 818-19; Falck Props., LLC v. Parkvale Fin. Corp. (In re Brownsville
Property Corp.), 469 B.R. 216, 224 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2012).
62See, e.g., Neilson v. Monterey Cnty. Bank (In re Cedar Funding, Inc.), No. C-12-00643, 2012 WL
3309683, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2012); S. Elec. Coil, LLC v. FirstMerit Bank, NA., No. 11 C 6135,
2011 WL 6318963, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2011); In re CorrLine Int'l, LLC, 516 B.R. 106, 136-37
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2014); In re Webb, No. 07-13703, 2012 WL 3638005, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Aug. 22,
2012); Int'l Tobacco Partners, 462 B.R. at 392; Husky Int'l Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz (In re Ritz), 459 B.R.
623, 631 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011); but see DeGirolamo v. Devonshire Fund, LLC (In re Myers), No. 11-
61426, 2013 WL 6080270, at *6 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Nov. 18, 2013).
"Compare Miller v. Enviro Care, Inc. (In re Rock Structures Excavating, Inc.), No. 2:12-CV-856,
2013 WL 1284969, at *5 (D. Utah Mar. 27, 2013); Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Appa.
lachian Fuels, LLC v. Energy Coal Res., Inc. (In re Appalachian Fuels, LLC), 472 B.R. 731, 741 (E.D. Ky.
2012); Burtch v. Seaport Capital, LLC (In re Direct Response Media, Inc.), 466 B.R. 626, 646 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2012); In re Safety Harbor Resort & Spa, 456 B.R. 703, 718 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011); Heller Ehrman
LLP v. Arnold & Porter, LLP (In re Heller Ehrman, LLP), No. 08-32514, 2011 WL 4542512, at *6
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2011) (holding that bankruptcy court has constitutional power to enter final
judgment in fraudulent transfer proceedings) with Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison (In re Belling-
ham Ins. Agency, Inc.), 702 F.3d 553, 562 (9th Cir. 2012), affd on other grounds, 134 S.Ct. 2165 (2014);
Feldman v. ABN Amro Mortg. Grp. Inc., 515 B.R. 443, 448-51 (E.D. Pa. 2014); Carroll v. Raynor (In re
Innovative Communication Corp.), No. 3:07-30012, 2013 WL 2631344, at *5 (D.VI. June 12, 2013);
Kirschner v. Agoglia, 476 B.R. 75, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Rosenberg v. Bookstein, 479 B.R. 584, 589 (D. Nev.
2012); Adelphia Recovery Trust v. FLP Grp., Inc., No. 11 Civ. 6847, 2012 WL 264180, at at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2012); Penson Fin. Servs., Inc. v. O'Connell (In re Arbco Capital Mgmt., LLP), 479 B.R.
254, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Gibson v. Tucker (In re G & S Livestock Co.), 478 B.R. 906, 915-916 (S.D. Ind.
2012); McCarthy v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA. (In re El-Atari), No. 1:11cvl090, 2011 WL 5828013, at *2
(E.D. Va. Nov. 18, 2011); In re Am. Hous. Found., 469 B.R. 257, 267-68 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2012); Burns v.
Dennis (In re Southeastern Materials, Inc.), 467 B.R. 337, 361-67 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2012); Meoli v. Hunt-
ington Nat'l Bank (In re Teleservices Grp., Inc.), 456 BR. 318, 338 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2012); Heller
Ehrman LLP v. Arnold & Porter, LLP (In re Heller Ehrman LLP), 464 B.R. 348, 354 (Bankr. N.D. Cal.
2011) (concluding that fraudulent conveyance claims brought under against a noncreditor are governed by
Stern). See also Boyd v. King Par, LLC, No. 11-1106, 2011 WL 5509873 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 10, 2011)
(noting the split in authority but not stating a conclusion). See generally Joshua C. Gerber, Note, "Why the
Fuss?": Stem v. Marshall and the Supreme Court's Understanding of Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction, 78
BROOKLYN L. REV. 989, 1021-1025 (2013) (arguing that the minority position is correct).
The Supreme Court rendered a decision in Bellingham, Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134
S.Ct. 2165 (2014), but did not explicitly discuss whether a bankruptcy court could render a final decision
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As to the second open issue after Stern, despite early concern about the
absence of explicit statutory language permitting a bankruptcy judge to hear
a Stern-core proceeding and issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law,64 most courts quickly concluded that they had the authority to do so. 6 5
Several districts amended their standing orders of reference to so state, and to
allow the district court to treat a final decision of the bankruptcy judge as if
it were proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law if the bankruptcy
judge purported to enter a final judgment in a matter in which a final deter-
mination was beyond his or her constitutional authority.66
in a fraudulent conveyance proceeding as neither party contested the conclusion of the lower court that
the fraudulent conveyance claim could not be decided by the bankruptcy court. Id. at 2172. The Court
did, however, mention in a footnote that "Granfinanciera held that a fraudulent conveyance claim under
Title 11 is not a matter of 'public right' for purposes of Article III . . . ." Id. at 2169 n.3.
'"See Samson v. Blixseth (In re Blixseth), No. 09-60452-7, 2011 WL 3274042, at *12 (Bankr. D. Mont.
Aug. 1, 2011) (holding that the bankruptcy court cannot constitutionally hear a fraudulent transfer claim),
amended by 463 B.R. 896, 906 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2012) (holding that the bankruptcy court has subject
matter jurisdiction over such claims).
"sSee, e.g., Osborne v. Kadoch (In re Aurora Capital, Inc., No. 12-61421, 2013 WL 2156821, at *4
(S.D. Fla. May 17, 2013); Rothrock v. PNC Bank, N.A. (In re Parco Merged Media Corp.), 489 B.R. 323,
326-327 (D. Me. 2013); Arbco Capital Mgm., 479 B.R. at 258; Blixseth v. Brown, 470 B.R. 562, 572 (D.
Mont. 2012); Adelphia Recovery Trust, 2012 WL 264180, at *6; Res-Ga Four LLC v. Avalon Builders of
Ga. LLC, No. 5:10-CV-463, 2012 WL 13544, at *10 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 4,2012); Paloian v. Am. Express Co.
(In re Canopy Fin., Inc.), 464 BR. 770, 775 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Field v. Lindell (In re Mortg. Store, Inc.), 464
BR. 421, 428 (D. Hawaii 2011); Heller Ehnman, 464 B.R. at 354-361 El-Atari, 2011 WL 5828013, at *4;
Tolliver v. Bank of America (In re Tolliver), 464 B.R. 720, 734-35 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2012); Justmed, Inc. v.
Byce (In re Byce), No. 1:11-cv-00378, 2011 WL 6210938, at *5 (D. Idaho Dec. 14, 2011); D & B Swine
Farms, Inc. v. Murphy-Brown, L.L.C. (In re D & B Swine Farms, Inc.), No. 09-02813-8-JRL, 2011 WL
6013218, at *3 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Dec. 2, 2011).
"
6See, e.g., Amended Standing Order of Reference (D. Del. Feb. 29, 2012); Standing Order of Reference,
No. 6:12-MC-26-ORL-22 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2012); Standing Order of Reference Regarding Title 11
(N.D. Fla. June 5, 2012); In re Bankruptcy Proceedings, No. 2012-25 (S.D. Fla. Mar 27, 2012); Amended
Standing Order of Reference (M.D. Ga. Feb. 21, 2012); Standing Order No. 13-1 (D. Kan. June 24, 2013);
Standing Order of Reference to the Bankr. Court under Title 11, No. 12-1 (D.N.J. Sept. 18, 2012); Referral
of Matters to the Bankruptcy Judges (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2012); Standing Order of Reference, 12 Misc.
00032 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2012); Standing Order of Reference (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 29, 2012); Amended Stand-
ing Order of Reference, No. 3:14mc44 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 14, 2014); Standing Order Concerning Title 11
Proceedings (D.S.C. Dec. 4, 2013); Amended Standing Order of Reference (D. Vt. June 22, 2012). The
language is almost identical in all these orders:
If a bankruptcy judge or district judge determines that entry of a final order or
judgment by a bankruptcy judge would not be consistent with Article III of the
United States Constitution in a particular proceeding referred under this order and
determined to be a core matter, the bankruptcy judge shall, unless otherwise or-
dered by the district court, hear the proceeding and submit proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law to the district court. The district court may treat any
order of the bankruptcy court as proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in
the event the district court concludes that the bankruptcy judge could not have
entered a final order or judgment consistent with Article III of the United States
Constitution.
Standing Order of Reference, D. Del.
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The Supreme Court validated the practice of the district courts in Execu-
tive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison.67 In a case involving fraudulent convey-
ance claims brought against a noncreditor (which all parties conceded were
the types of claims that, under Stern, could not be determined by a bank-
ruptcy judge consistent with Article III of the U.S. Constitution), the Su-
preme Court held that Stern permitted a bankruptcy judge to treat core
matters as to which the judge could not render a final judgment as if they
were noncore matters under § 157(c).68 Although the bankruptcy judge did
not submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district
court, the district court did review the bankruptcy court's grant of summary
judgment against the noncreditor on a de novo basis and entered its own
judgment. 69 Therefore the noncreditor received exactly what the non-
creditor was entitled to-a final determination by an Article III judge.70
The issue of whether a litigant against whom a Stern-type core proceed-
ing has been initiated can consent to a final determination by a non-Article
III bankruptcy judge was presented in Executive Benefits,7' but the Court did
not decide the issue because it concluded that the litigant had received its
constitutional due, even in the absence of consent. But in a subsequent case,
Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif,72 the court concluded that a bank-
ruptcy judge can constitutionally adjudicate Stern claims when the litigants
knowingly and voluntarily consent.73
Uncertainty about the scope of the bankruptcy court's power to enter
final judgments with respect to core matters has encouraged many litigants to
seek withdrawal of the reference by the district court, mostly unsuccess-
fully.7 4 Motions to withdraw are sometimes premised on other arguments.
67134 S. Ct. 2165 (2014).
681d. at 2173.
691d. at 2175.
701d
7 1The Ninth Circuit had concluded that the noncreditor had impliedly consented to final adjudication
by the bankruptcy court. Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc.),
702 F.3d 553, 566-70 (9th Cir. 2012), The Court did not need to reach the issue because it concluded that
the bankruptcy court's purported -final" judgment was not treated as a final judgment by the district
court.
72135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015).
75Id. at 1939.
74See part IV infra. See generally Tyson A. Crist, Stern v. Marshall: Application of the Supreme
Court's Landmark Decision in the Lower Courts, 86 Am. BANKR. LJ. 627, 644-47 (2012).
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III. STANDARDS FOR GRANTING MOTIONS TO WITHDRAW
THE REFERENCE
As previously discussed,7" the power of a district court to withdraw the
reference is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 157(d). The two sentences in that
statutory provision describe circumstances under which the district court
must withdraw the reference (so-called mandatory withdrawal) and those
under which the district court may withdraw the reference (discretionary or
permissive withdrawal).
The second sentence of § 157(d) deals with mandatory withdrawal of the
reference. By its terms, it requires the district court to withdraw the refer-
ence with respect to any proceeding "if the court determines that resolution
of the proceeding requires consideration of both title 11 and other laws of the
United States regulating organizations or activities affecting interstate com-
merce."7 6 The purpose of this provision is to ensure that "the assertion of a
federally created right will be considered outside the narrow confines of a
bankruptcy court proceeding by a district court, which considers laws regu-
lating interstate commerce on a daily basis and is better equipped to deter-
mine them than are bankruptcy judges."77
Although the literal language of the mandatory withdrawal provision
would seem to require withdrawal of a great many bankruptcy proceedings,78
the case law has interpreted the language to require withdrawal only when
"substantial and material consideration" of federal statutes other than the
Bankruptcy Code affecting interstate commerce "is necessary for the resolu-
tion of a case or proceeding." 79 The court must be required to interpret the
federal law, not merely apply it, to resolve the proceeding before withdrawal
is required.so In addition, mandatory withdrawal is limited to cases in which
"sSee supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
7628 U.S.C. § 157(d) (second sentence).
"Murray v. Warren County Sheriffs Dept. (In re Avtex Fibers-Font Royal, Inc.), No. 90-20290T,
1991 WL 25460, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 1991).
"The mandatory withdrawal provisions are applicable only to "proceedings," not to the bankruptcy
case as a whole. See, e.g., Manila Indus. Inc. v. Ondova Ltd., No. 3:09-CV-1551-RF, 2009 WL 3673026,
at *1 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 3, 2009).
"In re White Motor Corp., 42 B.R. 693, 703, 704 (N.D. Ohio. 1984). See also Shugrue v. Air Line
Pilots Ass'n (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.), 922 F.2d 984, 995 (2d Cir. 1990); Schwab v. Capital Blue
Cross, No. 3:13-1772, 2013 WL 3947125, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2013); Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v.
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (In re Federated Dept. Stores, Inc.), 189 B.R 142, 144 (S.D. Ohio 1995); Am.
Body Armor & Equip., Inc. v. Clark (In re Am. Body Armor & Equip., Inc.), 155 B.R. 588, 590 (M.D. Fla.
1993); Carter Day Indus., Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (In re Combustion Equip. Assocs., Inc.), 67 B.R.
709, 711-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
soSee, e.g., In re Vicars Ins. Agency, Inc. 96 F.3d 949, 954 (7th Cir. 1993); City of New York v. Exxon
Corp, 932 F.2d 1020, 1026 (2d Cir. 1991); Greenspan v. Paul Hastings Janofsky & Walker LLP, No. C12-
01148, 2012 WL 3283516, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2012); Am. Freight Sys., Inc, v. Interstate Comm'n
(In re Am. Freight Sys., Inc.), 150 B.R. 790, 793 (D. Kan. 1993).
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the federal law at issue regulates interstate commerce. Therefore, only if the
laws are "rooted in" the Commerce Clause of the Constitution8 will the
district court be required to withdraw the reference.82  Courts have uni-
formly rejected the contention that the district court must withdraw the
reference of any proceedings that the bankruptcy judge cannot constitution-
ally decide under Stern.83
The permissive withdrawal provision permits the district court to with-
draw all or any part of a case or proceeding 'for cause shown."84 District
courts have been directed to 'consider the efficient use of judicial resources,
delay and cost to the parties, uniformity of bankruptcy administration, the
prevention of forum shopping, and other related factors."8 The Second Cir-
cuit in the Orion Pictures case8 6 stated that, in addition to these factors, the
primary consideration for the district court is "whether the claim is core or
non-core, since it is upon this issue that questions of efficiency and uniformity
will turn."87 Because it was assumed at the time Orion was decided that
bankruptcy judges could hear and determine all core matters, the Second Cir-
"
1U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3 empowers Congress to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
"See, e.g., In re Ziviello-Howell, No. 2:11-cv-00916, 2011 WL 2144417, at *2-3 (E.D. Cal. May 31,
2011); S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Grps., Inc. 252 B.R. 373, 382 (E.D. Tex. 2000); Hatzel
& Buehler, Inc. v. Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc. 107 BR. 34, 38 (D. Del. 1989); U.S. v. ILCO, Inc., 48
BR. 1016, 1021-22 (N.D. Ala. 1985). See generally Erich D. Andersen, Closing the Escape Hatch in the
Mandatory Withdrawal Provision of 28 U.S.C. § 157(d), 36 UCLA L. REv. 417, 422-24 (1988).
8'See, e.g., Gecker v. Flynn (In re Emerald Casino, Inc., 467 B.R. 128, 133 (N.D. Ill. 2012); Heller
Ehrman LLP v. Arnold & Porter, LLP (In re Heller Ehrman LLP), 464 B.R. 348, 354-57 (N.D. Cal. 2012);
Greenspan, 2012 WL 3283516, at *3; Ortiz v. Aurora Health Care, Inc. (In re Ortiz), No. 12-C-0295,
2012 BL 233386 at *5 (E.D. Wis. Sep[t. 7, 2012); Walker, Truesdell, Roth & Assocs. v. Blackstone Grp.,
L.P. (In re Extended Stay, Inc.), 466 B.R. 188, 200-202 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Justmed, Inc. v. Byce (In re Byce),
No. 1:11-cv-00378, 2011 WL 6210938, at *2-4 (D. Idaho Dec. 14, 2011); McCarthy v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N-A. (In re El-Atari), No. 1:11cv1090, 2011 WL 5828013, at *3-7 (E.D. Va. Nov. 18, 2011); Kelley v.
JPMorgan Chase & Co., 464 B.R 854, 863 (D. Minn. 2011).
8428 U.S.C. § 157(d) (first sentence).
asSecurity Farms v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers, 124 F.3d 999,
1008 (9th Cir. 1997). See also Tyler v. McLane Foodservice, Inc. (In re QSM, LLC), 453 B.R. 807, 809-
810 (E.D. Va. 2011) (identifying six factors to be considered in connection with motion for permissive
withdrawal: "(i) whether the proceeding is core or non-core, (ii) the uniform administration of bankruptcy
proceedings, (iii) expediting the bankruptcy process and promoting judicial economy, (iv) the efficient use
of debtors' and creditors' resources, (v) the reduction of forum shopping, and (vi) the preservation of the
right to a jury trial"). Many courts apply these six factors. See, e.g., Chesapeake Trust v. Chesapeake Bay
Enters., Inc., No. 3:13CV344, 2014 WL 202028, at *4-5 (E.D. Va. Jan 17, 2014); Douglas Holding Co. v.
City of Princeton, No. 1:1 1-MC-0078, 2013 BL 206154, at *1 (S.D. W. Va. Aug. 2, 2013); Official Com-
mittee of Unsecured Creditors of Appalachian Fuels, LLC, v. Energy Coal Res., Inc. (In re Appalachian
Fuels, LLC), 472 BR. 731, 744 (E.D. Ky. 2012); Adler v. Walker (In re Gulf States Long Term Acute
Care of Covington, L.L.C.), 455 B.R 869, 874 (E.D. La. 2011); In re OCA, Inc., 410 BR. 443, 449 (E.D. La.
2007).
"Orion Pictures Corp. v. Showtime Networks, Inc. (In re Orion Pictures Corp.), 4 F.3d 1095 (2d Cir.
1993).
87Id. at 1101.
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cuit stated that it would likely be inefficient to hear a core matter in the
district court "given that the bankruptcy court generally will be more famil-
iar with the facts and issues."88 On the other hand, if the matter was
noncore, and was therefore subject to de novo review in the Article III dis-
trict court, a court might "conclude that in a given case unnecessary costs
could be avoided by a single proceeding in the district court."89 After the
Supreme Court's decision in Stern, most courts have reinterpreted the Orion
analysis to require a focus not merely on the core/noncore distinction, but on
whether the non-Article III bankruptcy judges can constitutionally render a
final decision on the matter.90
If one of the parties files a jury demand, and all parties do not consent to a
jury trial in the bankruptcy court,91 cause for withdrawal is established.92
However, the district court may delay the withdrawal until completion of all
pretrial matters in the bankruptcy court because of the bankruptcy judge's
familiarity with the parties and the issues.9 3
IV. MOTIONS TO WITHDRAW THE REFERENCE-AN
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Stern holds that the district court's authority to withdraw the reference
does not in itself resolve the constitutional questions about the bankruptcy
88 1d.
891d
"See, e.g., Kirschenbaum v. Fed. Ins. Co. (In re EMS Fin. Servs., LLC), 491 B.R. 196, 202 (E.D.N.Y.
2013); Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 486 B.R. 579, 582 & n.1 (S.D.N.Y.
2013); Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, 462 BR. 457, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2011);
Dynegy Danskammer, L.L.C. v. Peabody COALTRADE Int'l Ltd., 905 F. Supp. 2d 526, 530 (S.D.N.Y.
2012); Penson Fin. Servs., Inc. v. O'Connell (In re Arbco Capital Mgmt., LLP), 479 BR. 254, 262
(S.D.N.Y. 2012).
9 1Under 28 U.S.C. § 157(e), if a party has a right to a jury trial with respect to any proceeding in the
bankruptcy case, the bankruptcy judge "may conduct the jury trial if specially designated to exercise such
jurisdiction by the district court and with the express consent of all the parties."
9
'See, e.g., Manning v. Methodist Hosps., Inc. (In re Merrillville Surgery Ctr., LLC), No. 2:12-CV-253,
2012 WL 3732855, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 28, 2012); Manley Truck Line, Inc. v. Mercantile Bank of
Kansas City, 106 B.R. 696, 697 (D. Kan. 1989).
93See, e.g., Sigma Micro Corp. v. Healthcentral.com (In re Healthcentral.com), 504 F.3d 775, 787 (9th
Cir. 2007); Loveridge v. Hall (In re Renewable Dev. Corp.), 500 B.R. 77, 92 (D. Utah 2013); Osborne v.
Kadoch (In re Aurora Capital, Inc., No. 12-61421, 2013 WL 2156821, at *2 (S.D. Fla. May 17, 2013);
Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.), 480 B.R.
179, 194-195 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. Nat'l Patent Dev. Corp. (In
re TMG Liquidation Co.), No. 7:12-629, 2012 WL 1986526, at *3 (D.S.C. June 4, 2012); Carpenter v. US
Bank, NA (In re Carpenter), No. 12-21, 2012 WL 5990222, at *3-4 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2012); McCarthy
v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re El-Atari), No. 1:12-cv-01237, 2012 WL 6020110, at *6 (E.D. Va. Nov.
27, 2012); Boyd v. King Par, LLC, No. 1:11-CV-1106, 2011 WL 5509873, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 10,
2011); Lattig v. 820 Mgmt. Trust (In re Lake At Las Vegas Joint Venture), No. 2:10-cv-1679, 2011 WL
1303216 (D. Nev. Mar. 31, 2011); CDX Liquidating Trust v. Venrock Assocs., No. 04C7236, 2005 WL
3953895, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2005); Hassett v. BancOhio Nat'l Bank (In re CIS Corp.), 172 B.R. 748,
763-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
2015) MOTIONS TO WITHDRAW THE REFERENCE 411
court's power. That authority does, however, permit the district court to
exercise the "essential attributes of judicial power" with respect to both
noncore proceedings and those core proceedings as to which the bankruptcy
court lacked the constitutional power to render a final decision. This study is
intended to examine the circumstances under which district courts exercise
that authority or decline to do so.
I chose to look at cases for the last full calendar year94 for which motions
to withdraw the reference had been filed with the district courts?5 In doing
my search, I used Bloomberg Law's Bankruptcy Practice area, which allows a
search of all bankruptcy cases on the district court dockets by keyword
(among other things). I looked at all cases initiated in the district court for
the period between January 1, 2013 and December 31, 2013 in which mo-
tions to withdraw the reference were filed.96 I then eliminated any cases in
9 4The selection of this period also allowed me to avoid any "bump" in motions that might be attributa-
ble to the initial concern about the impact of Stem on the exercise of jurisdiction by the bankruptcy court
for the year following that decision, which was not a typical sample.
9
'In most districts, the motion to withdraw the reference is initially filed with the clerk of the bank-
ruptcy court. Compare Alaska L.B.R. 5011-1(a); Ariz. L.B.R. 5011-2(a); N.D. Cal. L.B.R. 5011-2(a); D.
Conn. L.B.R. 5011-1; D. Del. L.B.R. 5011-1; N.D. Fla. L.B.R. 5011-1.B(1); M.D. Fla. L.B.R. 5011-1(a)(1);
S.D. Fla. L.B.R. 5011-1(A); N.D. Ga. L.B.R. 5011-1(a); D. Hawaii L.B.R. 5011-1(a); N.D. Ind. L.R. 200-
1(b)(1)(B); S.D. Ind. L.B.R. B-5011-1(a); M.D. La. L.B.R. 5011-1(a) and L.R. 83.4.3.A.2; W.D. La. L.R.
83.4.3(A)(2); D. Md. L.R. 405.2(a); D. Mass. L.B.R. 5011-1; W.D. Mich. L.B.R. 5011(a); D. Minn. L.B.R.
5011-1; N.D. Miss. & S.D. Miss. L.B.R. 5011-1(a); E.D. Mo. L.B.R. 5011.C; D. Neb. Gen. R. 1.5(b)(1); D.
Nev. L.R. 5011(a); D.N.H. L.B.R. 5011-1; D.N.J. L.B.R. 5011-1; D.N.M. L.B.R. 5011-1; E.D.N.Y. L.B.R.
5011-1; N.D.N.Y. L.B.R. 5011-1(a); S.D.N.Y. L.B.R. 5011-1; M.D.N.C. L.B.R. 5011-1(a); S.D. Ohio L.B.R.
5011-1(a); E.D. Okla. L.B.R. 5011-1(A) & L. Civ. R. 84.1(b)(1); N.D. Okla. L.B.R. 5011-1 & L. Civ. R.
84.1(b)(1); W.D. Okla. L.B.R. 5011-1 & L. Cv. R. 81.4(b)(2); E.D. Pa. L.B.R. 5011-1(c); D.P.R. L.B.R.
5011-1(a); D.R.I. L.B.R. 5011-1(a); D.S.C. L.B.R. 5011-1(a); M.D. Tenn. L.B.R. 5011-2(a); N.D. Tex.
L.B.R. 5011-1(a); S.D. Tex. L.B.R. 5011-1; W.D. Tex. L.B.R. 5011(a); D. Utah Civ. R. 83-7.4(a); E.D. Va.
L.B.R. 5011-1(a); E.D. Wash. L.B.R. 5011-1(b); W.D Wash. L.B.R. 5011-1(b); S.D. W. Va. L.B.R. 5011-1;
D. Wyo. L.B.R. 5011-1(a) & L. Civ. R. 85(c)(1) (motion is filed with the clerk of the bankruptcy court)
with C.D. Cal. L.B.R. 5011-1; D. Mont. L.B.R. 5011-1(a) (motion is filed with the clerk of the district
court and a copy is filed with the bankruptcy court). If the motion is filed with the bankruptcy court, in
some districts it is immediately transmitted to the district court and all further pleadings are made with
the district court. See, e.g., N.D. Cal. L.B. R. 5011-2(c); S.D. Cal. L.B.R. 5011-1(a), (b); D. Colo. L.B.R.
5011-1(a); D. Conn. L.B.R. 5011-1; D. Del. L.B.R. 5011-1; D.D.C. L.B.R. 5011-2(a); N.D. Fla. L.B.R. 5011-
1.B((3); D. Hawaii L.B.R. 5011-1(a); M.D. La. L.B.R. 5011-1(d) and L.R. 83.4.3(A)(4); W.D. La. L.R.
83.4.3(A)(4); D.NJ. L.B.R. 5011-1; E.D.N.Y. L.B.R. 5011-1; S.D.N.Y. L.B.R. 5011-1; E.D. Pa. L.B.R. 5011-
1(f); M.D. Tenn. L.B.R. 5011-2(c); D. Utah Civ. R. 83-7.4(d)(2); cf. D.N.M. L.B.R. 5011-1 (responsive
papers are to be filed with both bankruptcy and district court). In others, all responsive pleadings are filed
in the bankruptcy court and then the complete file is transmitted to the district court. See, e.g., S.D. Cal.
L.B.R. 5011-1(b); D. Colo. L.B.R. 5011-1(c)-(e); D.D.C. L.B.R. 5011-2(d)-(f); M.D. Fla. L.B.R. 5011-1(a)(3);
S.D. Fla. L.B.R. 5011-1(C); N.D. Ga. L.B.R. 5011-5; N.D. Ind. L.R. 200-1(b)(1)(C); S.D. Ind. L.B.R. B-5011-
1(f); W.D. Mich. L.B.R. 5011(f); N.D. Miss. & S.D. Miss. L.B.R. 5011-1(a)(5); E.D. Mo. L.B.R. 5011(C); D.
Nev. L.R. 5011(e); N.D.N.Y. L.B.R. 5011-1(c); M.D.N.C. L.B.R. 5011-1(e); S.D. Ohio L.B.R. 5011-1(d);
D.P.R. L.B.R. 5011-1(b); D.R.I. L.B.R. 5011-1(b); D.S.C. L.B.R. 5o11-1(d); E.D. Va. L.B.R. 5011-1(E); E.D.
Wash. L.B.R. 5011-1(c); W.D. Wash. L.B.R. 5011-1(c); D. Wyo. Civ. R. 85(c)(2).
"Most of the cases listed in the cause of action field either "28:157 Motion to Withdraw Reference"
or "28:0157 Motion for Withdrawal of Reference." However, this field is left to the discretion of the
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which the court did not issue a decision on withdrawal (for reasons such as
settlement or withdrawal of the motion). I also eliminated cases in which the
docket indicated that a motion was filed and a decision was rendered, but the
text of the motion and decision were not available in electronic format. I
excluded a number of other cases because the court decided the motion for
reasons other than an application of 28 U.S.C. § 157(d).97 After eliminating
those cases, I had a set of 253 motions to withdraw the reference filed with
the district courts during that period on which decisions on the merits were
issued. Exhibit A is an alphabetical list of the cases.
The questions that I wished to examine were the following:
(1) Where were the motions filed (what circuit, what district)?
(2) In what cases were the motions filed (i.e., under which chapter was
the original bankruptcy case filed)?
(3) Who filed the motion (the trustee, the debtor in possession, a credi-
tor, or another party)?
(4) Was the motion opposed and did the bankruptcy judge take a
position?
(5) What was the basis of the motion (mandatory withdrawal or permis-
sive, and what was the nature of the claim)?
litigant, and other cases were labelled "withdrawal of bankruptcy matter," "transmission of bankruptcy
reference," "removal of claim in civil action related to BK. Case," "28:1331 Fed. Question," '28:0157 Bank-
ruptcy Non-Core Proceedings," "28:1334(b) Proceeding arising/related to case under title 11," or "28:157b
Bankruptcy Claim to be tried in U.S District Court." Some withdrawal motions were labelled as a bank-
ruptcy appeal, or as "Findings, Concl. & Proposed Judgment" or simply as "11:101 Bankruptcy" or "civil
miscellaneous case." Some had no cause of action listed at all. I cross-referenced all motions by doing a
keyword search, "motion NP/10 withdraw NP/3 reference" with word modifications enabled.
9 7 For example, I omitted all cases in which the motion was denied as moot or as untimely or in which
the court concluded that the movant had consented to the exercise of authority by the bankruptcy court.
Eleven cases that were partially withdrawn by Judge J. Randal Hall of the Southern District of Georgia on
August 6 and 7 were also excluded as they were apparently withdrawn solely for the administrative
purpose of dealing with the award of commissions to the chapter 7 trustee, see Nos. 1:13-cv-00131-141
(S.D. Ga.). One case was excluded because the reference was withdrawn pursuant to prior court order
providing for procedural consolidation of all bankruptcy cases involving related debtors in the Southern
District of New York, see In re Bundy Canyon Land Dev., LLC, No. 2:13-cv01786 (D. Nev. Sept. 26,
2013). Another was not included because the withdrawal was solely for the purpose of changing venue,
see Cameron Cnty. Reg'I Mobility Auth. v. Ballenger Constr., No. 1:13-cv-00027 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 21,
2013). In another case the motion was denied solely because the district court was enforcing a provision
of the confirmed plan of reorganization that required the bankruptcy court to rule on the proceeding, see
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Corus Bankshares Inc., No. 1:13-cv-00058 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2013). In Picard
v. Kohn, No. 1:13-cv-08994 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2013), the district judge denied the motion solely to permit
the defendants to assert their defense that the bankruptcy court lacked personal jurisdiction over them, a
"threshold matter"). Three other cases arising from the Madoff bankruptcy case, Picard v. Montbarry Inc.,
No. 1:13-cv-00502 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2013); Picard v. LGT Bank in Liechtenstein Ltd., No. 1:13-cv-01394
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2013); and Picard v. Union Sec. Inv. Trust Co., No. 1:13-cv04429 (S.D.N.Y. June 26,
2013) were not included because the district court granted the motions to withdraw the reference solely
to permit the cases to be included in consolidated briefing ordered with respect to dozens of other cases on
discrete issues of law relevant to all of them.
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(6) Was a jury trial requested?
(7) Was the motion granted or denied, and how did the other factors
relate to the ultimate decision?
1. WHERE THE MOTIONS WERE FILED
The following chart shows the number of cases seeking withdrawal of the
reference included in this study filed in the district courts within each circuit
during 2013. The Ninth Circuit had 50% more motions filed than the Fifth
Circuit and had more than three times as many motions filed than any other
circuit. The Fifth Circuit had twice as many motions filed as the other cir-
cuits, other than the Ninth Circuit. However, the high number of motions in
the Ninth Circuit was attributable in part to multiple motions filed in just
three cases, the Howrey LLP bankruptcy (seven motions), the LLS America
LLC bankruptcy (ten motions) and the Meridian Funds bankruptcy (three
motions), totaling twenty motions of the sixty-five in that circuit, almost a
third.
Even without regard to the multiple motions filed in the three cases in
the Ninth Circuit, one might expect that the Ninth Circuit would have more
motions to withdraw the reference, simply because the Ninth Circuit has
more bankruptcy filings than any other circuit. For example, in 2013 there
were 222,544 bankruptcy filings in the Ninth Circuit, as compared with
161,832 in the Eleventh Circuit (the next-highest total).98 (Of course, not all
the motions to withdraw the reference were made in cases filed in 2013, but
the statistics illustrate the relative pools from which such motions are made.)
Even if one looks at the statistics on adversary proceedings commenced in the
various circuits, the Ninth Circuit leads all others.99
What is surprising is the high number of motions filed in the Fifth Cir-
cuit, whose total case filings in 2013 were lower than the Fourth, Sixth,
Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, 00 and whose adversary proceeding
"Figures are taken from Table F-2, U.S. Bankruptcy Courts-Business and Nonbusiness Cases Com-
menced, by Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, During the Twelve-Month Period Ending December 31,
2013, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/2013-bankruptcy.
filings.aspx.
"For each of the twelve-month periods ending December 31, 2012 and December 31, 2013, the Ninth
Circuit had far more adversary proceedings filed than any other circuit, 11,313 in 2012, and 8,478 in 2013.
The next highest totals for any circuit were in the Sixth Circuit, which had 7,990 adversary proceedings
filed in 2012, and 6,117 in 2013. See Table F-8, U.S. Bankruptcy Courts-Adversary Proceedings Com-
menced, Terminated and Pending Under the Bankruptcy Code During the 12-Month Periods Ending
December 31, 2012 and 2013, available at www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/StatisticalTablesFor
TheFederalJudiciary/2013/december/FO8Decl3.pdf.
"Total bankruptcy case filings were as follows: D.C. Circuit (833); First Circuit (33,138); Second
Circuit (45,017); Third Circuit (59,944); Fourth Circuit (79,537); Fifth Circuit (69,100); Sixth Circuit
(150,779); Seventh Circuit (123,550); Eighth Circuit (63,718); Ninth Circuit (222,544); Tenth Circuit
(61,940); Eleventh Circuit (161,832). See Table F-2, note 97 supra.
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filings in the twelve-month periods ending March 31, 2012 and March 31,
2013 were lower than the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits.' 0 Perhaps lawyers in the Fifth Circuit hold
the district court judges in higher regard than they do the bankruptcy judges
in their districts. Perhaps the bankruptcy judges in the Fifth Circuit (who, as
discussed later, in two districts in the circuit must write reports and recom-
mendations on motions to withdraw the reference) are more reluctant than in
other circuits to take action in cases in which they do not have the constitu-
tional power to issue final decisions. Perhaps the Fifth Circuit simply has
more adversary proceedings that require jury trials, and the parties are less
likely to settle there. The cases do not provide a basis for any conclusion
about why the Fifth Circuit has a disproportionate number of such motions.
NUMBER OF MOTONS TO WITHDRAW REFERENCE BY CIRCUIT
Circuit I D.C. I 1st I 2nd I 3rd I 4th 5th I 6th I 7th I 8th I 9th I 10th I 11th
Number 0 11102 22103 20104 17105 46106 16107 17108 6109 65110 14111 19112
Within those circuits where a motion was filed, the number filed in each
district varied considerably. Only six districts had ten or more motions
"o'See Table F-8, note 99, supra.
'uoAdams; Atlas; Cary; C.R. Stone; Cruickshank; Ng; Scarcelli; Schroder; Shaffer; Weiss; Testramski.
'o'Billet; Country Fare; Dreier; Federal Housing; Flaxer; Global Aviation; Kirschenbaum; Krakowski;
Lehman I; Lehman II; LightSquared; McCord; Polverari; Refco; Renco; Ricoh I; Ricoh II; SageCrest I;
SageCrest II; TPG; T3; USA United.
'
04Allen; Bonarrigo; IH; Innova; Kretz; Lengyel; Majestic; Matheny; Okechuku; Peterson; Pressman;
Raval; Schwab; Slobodian; Springel I; Springel II; Sun Capital; THZ; Transcontinental; WL Homes. IH
and Sun Capital were both filed with respect to the same adversary proceeding.
'Al Dosari; Applewood; Arzt; Bell Builders; BF Saul; Bullard; Canal Walk; Chesapeake; Gold; Jemsek;
Lemons; McGuire; NMFC; Plum Creek; Spencer; Viera; Warren.
'
06 Able Machine Works; Adventure Harbor; Alabama/Main; Ansung; Barra; Biesiada; Brown; Cage;
Caillouet; Compton; Diamond Offshore; Englehart; Erchonia; Fulbright; Global Gaming; Hearthwood; Keba;
Kite I; Kite II; Macquarie; Magnificent; Mcloba; Motamedi; Nakamura; Newhouse; Nguyen; Pal-Con;
Parker; Romo; Santa Barbara; Seacor; Sojourner; TCB; Texas Sterling; UPH I; UPH II; UPH III; Villegas;
West; Williams I; Williams II; Williams III; Williams IV; Williams V; Williams VI; Williams VII.
'o
7Austin; Chambers; Cyber; Energy Conversion; Greektown; Grossman; Hauk; Laikin; Lain; Limor;
Logan; Lucas; McKinstry; Posey; Timco; Villages.
'
0 8Archdiocese I; Archdiocese II; Athos; Baldi; Desmond; Home Casual; H&P; Moglia; New Energy;
PNC Bank; Pro-Pac; Pry; Pulsifer I; Pulsifer II; Steege; Triad Group; Triad Pharmaceuticals.
1
0 9Calderon; Needler; Panther I; Panther II; Willson; Winkler.
'
1
oABC; Azam; Bagley; Bell; Berg; Barton; Clinica; Cobe; Cushman; Diamond Decisions; Dick; Edwards;
Evergreen; Field; Ginzburg; Hoskins; Howrey I; Howrey II; Howrey III; Howrey IV; Howrey V; Howrey VI;
Howrey VII; IES; Impeva; Kirkland; Klein; Lancaster; LLS I; LLS II; LLS III; LLS IV; LLS V; LLS VI; LLS
VII: LLS VIII; LLS IX; LLS X; Locke; Marini; McZeal; Melcher; Melech; Munoz-Flores; New Meatco;
Oracle; Parriott; Paulo; Prevost; Prior; Roll Tide I; Roll Tide II; Rosales; R2D2; Samson; Scaccianoce;
Sharp; Shengdatech; Sladky; SNTL; Taicom; Torchia; Vaccaro; Wilenchik. Zazzali.
.. Brown-Minneapolis; Chance; Gould; Hess; jubber; Melot I; Melot II; SVS; Swinson; Vanderpol;
Wagner I; Wagner II; Wagner III; Tee-Smith.
"
2ABN; Advanced Telecommunication; Agile I; Agile II; Beck; Gowdy; Herendeen; Laddin; Lisenby;
Mansmann; McKean; Newman; Ogier; Petrano; Raimondo; Rosen; Saad; Stettin; Stevenson.
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filed," 3 and two of them were in California. The Western District of
Washington crossed that threshold only because of the ten motions in the
LLS America case filed there. Each of the other districts with ten or more
motions would still have had ten or more even if they had not had multiple
motions filed in a single case.
The Southern District of Texas had the most motions (twenty), but ten
of those were filed in just two cases-the bankruptcy cases of ATP Oil &
Gas Co.11 4 and Quality Infusion Care Inc."1 5 Similarly, all of the thirteen
motions filed in the Western District of Washington were filed in just two
cases, LLS America'16 and Meridian Investors Trust." 7  Of the fourteen
motions filed in the Northern District of California, seven were filed in the
bankruptcy case of Howrey LLP."is Other districts that had multiple
motions from single bankruptcy cases were the District of Massachusetts,'9
the District of Connecticut,1 20 the Eastern District of New York,1 21 the
Southern District of New York,1 22 the District of Delaware,123 the District
of the Virgin Islands,124 the District of Maryland.125 the Western District of
Louisiana,1 2 6 the Northern District of Texas,1 2 7 the Western District of
Texas,1 28 the Eastern District of Wisconsin,1 29 the Western District of
Arkansas,1 0 the District of Arizona,' 3 1 the District of New Mexico,13 2 and
the Southern District of Florida.133 A motion to withdraw the reference in a
case tends to encourage additional such motions and, as discussed later, when
one such motion is successful, the existence of a related case at the district
court vastly increases the likelihood that a subsequent motion will be
113S.D.N.Y., S.D. Tex., C.D. Cal., N.D. Cal., S.D. Fla., W.D. Wash.
I1 4Keba; Macquarie; Seacor.
"'Williams I; Williams II; Williams III; Williams IV; Williams V; Williams VI; Williams VII.
116LLS I; LLS II; LLS III; LLS IV; LLS V; LLS VI; LLS VII; LLS VIII; LLS IX; LLS X.
"
7 ABC, Berg; Prevost.
"'Howrey I; Howrey II; Howrey III; Howrey IV; Howrey V; Howrey VI; Howrey VI.
"
9 Adams; Cary; Schroder; Shaffer.
'
20SageCrest I; SageCrest II.
"'McCord; USA United.
'
22Lehman I; Lehman II; and Ricoh I; Ricoh II.
123IH; Sun Capital.
'2 4Springel I; Springel II.
"'BF Saul; Bullard and Bell Builders; Canal Walk; Spencer.
"'Kite I; Kite II.
157Mcloba; Sojourner and Erchonia; Santa Barbara.
1 28 UPH I; UPH II; UPH III.
129Archdiocese I; Archdiocese II and Pulsifer I; Pulsifer II and Triad Group; Triad Pharmaceuticals and
H&P.
noPanther I; Panther II.
"'Roll Tide I; Roll Tide II.
"'Wagner I; Wagner II; Wagner III.
"'ABN; Agile I; Agile II; Newman.
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granted.1s4
NUMBER OF MOTIONS TO WITHDRAW BY DISTRICT
1st Circuit 11
D. Mass. 9135
D. Me. 1136
D.N.H. 0
D.R.I. 0
D.P.R. 1137
2nd Circuit 22
D. Conn. 4138
E.D.N.Y. 5139
S.D.N.Y. 13140
W.D.N.Y. 0
D. Vt. 0
3rd Circuit 20
D. Del. 6141
D.N.J. 6142
E.D. Pa. 1143
M.D. Pa. 5144
W.D. Pa. O
DVI. 214s
4th Circuit 17
D. Md. 6146
E.D.N.C. 1147
M.D.N.C. O
W.D.N.C. 214
D.S.C. 2149
S34 ee discussion at note 283, infra.
'"Adams; Cary; C.R. Stone; Cruickshank; N'Tg; Schroder; Shaffer; Weiss; Testramski.
136 Scarcelli.
'"Atlas.
'
38Country Fare; Polverari; SageCrest I; SageCrest II.
"'Billet; Global Aviation; Kirschenbaum; McCord; USA United.
1 40Dreier; Federal Housing; Flaxer; Krakowski; Lehman I; Lehman II; LightSquared; Refco; Renco; Ricoh
I; Ricoh II; TPG; T3.
"ilH; Majestic; Matheny; Sun Capital; THQ WL Homes.
'
42Allen; Innova; Kretz; Okechuku; Peterson; Raval.
143Pressman.
"
4 Bonarrigo; Lengyel; Schwab; Slobodian; Transcontinental.
u'sSpringel I; Springel II.
146Al Dosari; Bell Builders; BF Saul; Bullard; Canal Walk; Spencer.
"'Warren.
'
48Applewood; Jemsek.
"'NMFC; Viera.
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E.D. Va. 3150
W.D. Va. 1151
N.D. W. Va. O
S.D. W. Va. 2152
Sth Circuit 46
E.D. La. 4153
M.D. La. 0
W.D. La. 3154
N.D. Miss. 0
S. D. Miss. 0
E.D. Tex. 2155
N. D. Tex. 9156
S.D. Tex. 20157
W.D. Tex. 8
6th Circuit 16
E.D. Ky. 1159
W.D. Ky. 0
E.D. Mich. 7160
W.D. Mich. 1161
N.D. Ohio 2162
S.D. Ohio 2163
E.D. Tenn. 0
M.D. Tenn. 3164
W.D. Tenn. 0
7th Circuit 17
N.D. Ill. 6165
C.D. Ill. 0
1s0 Arzt; Chesapeake; Gold.
"s'Plum Creek.
1"Lemons; McGuire.
"'Able Machine Works; Adventure Harbor; Caillouet; Magnificent.
154Global Gaming; Kite I; Kite II.
'"Parker; TCB.
1 6Ansung; Brown; Erchonia; Hearthwood; Mcloba; Newhouse; Pal-Con; Santa Barbara; Sojourner.
"Alabama/Main; Biesiada; Cage; Compton; Diamond Offshore; Englehart; Keba; Macquarie;
Motamedi; Nguyen; Seacor; Villegas; West; Williams I; Williams II; Williams III; Williams IV; Williams V;
Williams VI; Williams VII.
"
5 Barra; Fulbright; Nakamura; Romo; Texas Sterling; UPH I; UPH II; UPH III.
"s
9 McKinstry.
'6Austin; Chambers; Energy Conversion; Greektown; Hauk; Timco; Villages.
'
6
'Cyber
'
62Grossman; Laikin.
'Logan; Lucas.
1'"Lain; Limor; Posey.
'Athos; Baldi; Desmond; Moglia; PNC Bank; Steege.
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S.D. Ill. 0
N.D. Ind. 1166
S.D. Ind. 1167
E.D. Wis. 8168
W.D. Wis. 1169
8th Circuit 6
E.D. Ark. 3170
W.D. Ark. 0
N.D. Iowa 0
S.D. Iowa 0
D. Minn. 0
E.D. Mo. 1171
W.D. Mo. 1172
D. Neb. 1173
D.N.D. 0
D.S.D. 0
9th Circuit 65
D. Alaska 0
D. Ariz. 5174
E.D. Cal. 4175
C.D. Cal. 17176
N.D. Cal. 151 7 7
S.D. Cal. 0
D. Hawaii 1178
D. Idaho l179
D. Mont. 1180
'
66New Energy.
167P.,y.
'
6
'Archdiocese I; Archdiocese II; H&P; Pro-Pac; Pulsifer I; Pulsifer II; Triad Group; Triad
Pharmaceuticals.
'
69 Home Casual.
17 oCalderon; Panther I; Panther II.
171 illson.
'
72Needler.
W7 3winkler.
'
7 4Clinica; Lancaster; Roll Tide I; Roll Tide II; Wilenchik.
s
7 5Bell; Dick; Prior; Sharp.
"
7 6Azam; Cobe; Diamond Decisions; Edwards; Evergreen; Ginzburg; IES; Kirkland; Klein; McZeal;
MunozFlores; New Meatco; Oracle; Paulo; R2D2; Scaccianoce; SNTL.
'
77Hoskins; Howrey I; Howrey II; Howrey III; Howrey IV; Howrey V; Howrey VI; Howrey VII; Impeva;
Melcher Rosales; Sladky; Taicom; Torchia; Vaccaro.
'
7
sField.
'
7 9Zazzali.
"soSamson.
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D. Nev. 8181
D. Ore. 0
E.D. Wash. 0
W.D. Wash. 13182
10th Circuit 14
D. Colo. 2183
D. Kansas 2184
D.N.M. 618s
E.D. Okla. 0
N.D. Okla. 1186
W.D. Okla. 18
D. Utah 2
D. Wyo. O
11th Circuit 19
N.D. Ala. 0
M.D. Ala. O
S.D. Ala. 2189
N.D. Ga. 3190
M.D. Ga. O
S.D. Ga. O0
N.D. Fla. 1191
M.D. Fla. 3192
S.D. Fla. 10193
2. IN WHAT CASES WERE THE MOTIONS FILED?
Motions to withdraw the reference are almost exclusively filed in chapter
7 and chapter 11 cases. The relative parity between chapter 7 and chapter
11 cases is rather surprising, given that the number of chapter 7 cases filed
annually far exceed the number of chapter 11 cases. For example, in 2013
there were 728,833 chapter 7 cases filed, and only 8,980 chapter 11 cases.1 94
'
1
'Bagley; Borton; Cushman; Locke; Marini; Melech; Parriott; Shengdatech.
18
2ABC; Berg; LLS I; LLS II; LLS III; LLS IV; LLS V; LLS VI; LLS VII: LLS VIII; LLS IX; LLS X;
Prevost.
183SVS; Vanderpol.
'Chance; Hess.
"
5 Brown-Minneapolis; Melot I; Melot II; Wagner I; Wagner II; Wagner III.
'
t Swinson.
C'7 Gould.
"'Jubber; Tee-Smith.
"Beck; Mansmann.
'9Laddin; Lisenby; Ogier.
19iPetrano.
'
92Advanced Telecommunication; Herendeen; Stevenson.
"
9 3ABN; Agile I; Agile II; Gowdy; McKean; Newman; Raimondo; Rosen; Saad; Stettin.
'See Table F-2, note 97 supra.
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Although there are vastly more chapter 13 cases filed than chapter 11 cases
(333,626 in 2013),195 motions to withdraw the reference are rarely filed in
chapter 13 cases. This suggests that, in large part, motions to withdraw the
reference are filed in business cases rather than personal bankruptcy cases.
The costs of pursuing such a motion are not justified in the usual consumer
bankruptcy case. The distribution of the cases in the study follows.19 6 (Note
that the number of cases is significantly lower than the number of motions,
because of multiple motions in several of the cases.)
CHAPTER OF CASE IN WHICH MOTIONS TO WITHDRAW WERE FILED
Chapter 7 11 12 13 1 15
Number of 95197 87198 3199 15200 1201
Cases (107 motions) (125 motions) 16 motions
'
9 51d.
'96Plum Creek is not included in the chart, because the bankruptcy case with which the motion was
related was closed in 1929, long before the Bankruptcy Code was enacted.
"
7Able Machine Works; Al Dosari; Alabama/Main; Arzt (converted from chapter 11); Athos; Atlas;
Austin; Baldi; Bell; Bell Builders; BF Saul; Biesiada; Billet; Bonarrigo; Borton; Brown-Minneapolis; Bullard;
Cage; Caillouet; Canal Walk; Chambers; Chance; Chesapeake (converted from chapter 11); Cobe
(converted from chapter 11); C.R. Stone; Cruickshank; Desmond (converted from chapter 11); Diamond
Decisions; Dick; Englehart; Field; Ginzburg (converted from chapter 11); Gold; Gowdy; Greektown;
Herendeen; Hess; Home Casual (converted from chapter 11); Hoskins; IH (converted from chapter 11);
Jubber; Kirkland; Kirschenbaum; Laikin; Limor; Lisenby; Logan (converted from chapter 11); Lucas;
McCord; McGuire; Melcher (converted from chapter 11); Melech; Melot I; Melot II; Moglia; Munoz-
Flores; Newhouse; Ng; Nguyen; NMFC; Ogier; Okechuku; Oracle; Pal-Con; Parker (converted from chapter
13); Peterson; PNC Bank; Polverari; Pressman; Pry; Roll Tide I (converted from chapter 11); Roll Tide II
(converted from chapter 11); Romo; Saad; Samson (converted from chapter 11); Schwab; Sladky; Slobodian;
Spencer; Steege; Stevenson; Sun Capital (converted from chapter 11); SVS; Swinson; Timco; Torchia
(converted from chapter 11); TPG; T3; USA United; Vanderpol; Viera; Villegas; Warren; Weiss; West;
Wilenchik; Williams I; Williams II; Williams III; Williams IV; Williams V; Williams VI; Williams VII;
Willson; WL Homes; Tee-Smith; Testramski.
IH and Sun Capital were filed with respect to the same chapter 7 case (IH 1 Inc.), as were Roll Tide I
and Roll Tide II (Weston Ranch Development L.L.C.); Bell Builders, Canal Walk, and Spencer (Bell
Builders, Inc.); BF Saul and Bullard (DTM Corp.); the seven Williams motions (Quality Infusion Care Inc.,
in a case converted from chapter 11); and McCord and USA United (USA United Fleet, Inc.). Melot I
and Melot II were brought against a husband and wife in separate cases.
'
98ABC; ABN; Adams. Advanced Telecommunication; Adventure Harbor; Agile I; Agile II; Allen;
Ansung; Applewood; Archdiocese I; Archdiocese II; Bagley; Barra; Berg; Brown (later converted to chapter
7); Cary; Clinica; Compton; Country Fare; Cushman; Cyber; Diamond Offshore; Dreier; Energy Conversion;
Erchonia; Evergreen; Federal Housing; Flaxer; Fulbright; Global Aviation; Global Gaming; Could;
Grossman; Hearthwood; Howrey I; Howrey II; Howrey III; Howrey IV; Howrey V; Howrey VI; Howrey VII;
H&P; IES; Impeva; Innova;Jemsek; Keba; Kite I; Kite II; Klein; Krakowski; Laddin; Lain; Lehman I; Lehman
II; LightSquared; LLS I; LLS II; LLS III; LLS IV; LLS V; LLS VI; LLS VII LLS VIII; LLS IX; LLS X;
Locke; Macquarie; Magnificent; Majestic; Marini; Matheny; McKinstry; Mcloba; Motamedi (converted
from chapter 13); Needler New Energy; New Meatco; Newman; Panther I; Panther II; the seven Howrey
cases; Parriott; Posey; Prevost; Prior; Pro-Pac; Raimondo; Raval; Refco; Renco; Ricoh I; Ricoh II; Rosen;
R2D2; SageCrest I; SageCrest II; Santa Barbara; Scaccianoce (converted from chapter 13); Scarcelli;
&hroder; Seacor; Shaffer; Sharp; Shengdatech; SNTL; Sojourner; Springel I; Springel II; Stettin; TCB;
Texas Sterling; THQ; Triad Group; Triad Pharmaceuticals; Transcontinental; UPH I; UPH II; UPH III;
Villages; Wagner I; Wagner II; Wagner III; Winkler; Zazzali. Adams. Cary, Schroder and Shaffer were
related cases involving the bankruptcy of New England Compounding Pharmacy. Kite I and Kite II were
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3. WHO FILED THE MOTION?
In 48 of the cases included in this study, the motion to withdraw the
reference was filed solely by a trustee (or the trustee's equivalent), 202 the
debtor,203 or the debtor in possession or reorganized debtor.20 4 In 153 cases,
the motion was filed solely by the defendant in a proceeding brought by a
trustee or debtor or debtor in possession or official committee of unsecured
creditors.205 In seven cases, the motion was filed jointly by plaintiff and de-
fendant. 206 In thirty-one cases, the motion was filed by a claimant or third
filed with respect to the same individual chapter 11 case. Other motions filed in the same chapter 11 case
were the ten LLS motions (LLS America LLC); the two Lehman motions (Lehman Brothers Holdings
Inc.); Archdiocese I and Archdiocese II (Archdiocese of Milwaukee); Keba, Macquarie and Seacor (ATP Oil
& Gas Corp.); Panther I and Panther II (Panther Mountain Land Development LLC); SageCrest I and
SageCrest II (SageCrest II LLC); Erchonia and Santa Barbara (PrimCogent Solutions LLC); ABN, Agile l,
Agile II and Newman (Palm Beach Finance Partners); Ricoh I and Ricoh II (Eastman Kodak Co.); Springel I
and Springel II (Innovation Communication Corp.); Wagner I; Wagner II; and Wagner III (Vaughan
Company, Realtors); and Mclober and Sojourner (R.L. Adkins Corp.). The three UPH motions were all
filed in the same consolidated bankruptcy cases, as were Triad Group, Triad Pharmaceuticals and H&P.
1
"Hauk. Lemons; Petrano.
2
mAzam; Beck; Calderon; Edwards; Kretz; Lancaster; Lengyel; Mansmann; McKean; McZeal;
Nakamura; Paulo; Pulsifer I; Pulsifer II; Rosales; Vaccaro. Pulsifer I and Pulsifer II were filed in the same
chapter 13 case.
201 Taicom.
20 2 Brown-Minneapolis; Caillouet; Chambers; Desmond; IH; Laddin; Limor; LLS I; LLS II; LLS III; LLS
IV; LLS V; LLS VI; LLS VII: LLS VIII; LLS IX; LLS X; McKinstry; Melcher; Ogier; Renco; Slobodian;
Stevenson; Sun Capital; Timco; Willson; cf Transcontinental (motion filed by liquidating agent) .
2 03Austin (pro se chapter 7 debtor); Azam; Bonarrigo; Borton; Dick (pro se chapter 7 debtor); Edwards
(pro se chapter 13 debtor); Hauk; Kretz; Lengyel; Mansmann; Paulo (pro se chapter 13 debtor); Pulsifer II.
2 04Advanced Telecommunication; Country Fare; H&P; Magnificent; Motamedi; Needler, Texas Ster-
ling; Triad Group; Triad Pharmaceuticals.
205ABC; Able Machine Works; ABN; Agile I; Agile II; Alabama/Main; Ansung; Archdiocese 1; Archdi-
ocese II; Arzt; Athos; Atlas; Bagley; Baldi; Barra; Beck; Bell; Bell Builders; Berg; BF Saul; Biesiada; Billet;
Brown; Bullard; Cage; Calderon; Canal Walk; Chance; Clinica; Cobe; Compton; C.R. Stone; Cruickshank;
Diamond Decisions; Dreier; Energy Conversion; Englehart; Erchonia; Evergreen; Field; Flaxer; Ginzburg;
Global Aviation; Global Gaming (counterclaim defendant was also plaintiff in original declaratory judg-
ment action against debtor); Gold; Gould; Gowdy; Grossman; Hearthwood; Hess; Hoskins; Howrey I;
Howrey II; Howrey III; Howrey IV; Howrey V; Howrey VI; Howrey VII; IES; Impeva; Innova; Jubber;
Kirkland; Kirschenbaum; Klein; Laikin; Lain; Lancaster; Lehman I; Lehman II; Lemons; LightSquared;
Lisenby; Locke; Logan; Majestic; Marini; McCord; McGuire; McKean; Mcloba; McZeal; Melech; Moglia;
Munoz-Flores; New Meatco; Newhouse; Newman; Ng; Nguyen; NMFC; Okechuku; Panther I; Panther II;
Parker; Parriott; Peterson; Pressman; Prevost; Prior; Pro-Pac; Pry; Pulsifer I; Raimondo; Refco; Ricoh II; Roll
Tide I; Roll Tide II; Rosales; Saad; SageCrest I; SageCrest II; Samson; Santa Barbara; Scaccianoce; Schwab;
Sharp; Shengdatech; Sladly; SNTL; Sojorner; Spencer; Springel I; Springel II; Steege; Stettin; SVS; Swinson;
Torchia; TPG; T3; UPH I; UPH II; UPH III; USA United; Vaccaro; Viera; Villages; Villegas; Wagner I;
Wagner II; Wagner III; Weiss; Wilenchik; Williams I; Williams II; Williams III; Williams IV; Williams V;
Williams VI; Williams VII; WL Homes; Yestramski.
20 6Nakamura; PNC Bank (motion filed by receiver for debtor jointly with creditor in involuntary
chapter 7 before order for relief entered); Taicom (joint motion filed by foreign representative and defen-
dant); THQ Warren; Winkler; Zazzali.
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party in a proceeding against the debtor. 20 7 In nine cases, the motion was
filed by a party to an adversary proceeding between two parties, neither of
which was the trustee or the debtor in possession. 208 In four cases, the bank'
ruptcy judge recommended withdrawal sua sponte.20 9 In another case, with'
drawal was sought by the United States Trustee with respect to proposed
sanctions for civil contempt.2 10
It is predictable that the vast majority of motions would be filed by a
defendant in an adversary proceeding commenced by the debtor or someone
representing the debtor. These proceedings include exercise of the avoiding
powers as well as state law claims brought on behalf of the debtor against
other parties, some of whom have no other involvement in the bankruptcy
case and no interest in litigating there. In many of these cases, the bank'
ruptcy court lacks the power to enter a final judgment and therefore litigants
may seek withdrawal to the district court to avoid duplication of efforts.
4. WAS THE MOTION OPPOSED?
In approximately 58% of the cases (147 cases) the motion was unop-
posed.2 11 In the others, a response in opposition to the motion was filed (and
207 Adventure Harbor; Al Dosari; Allen; Cyber; Diamond Offshore; Federal Housing; Fulbright; Home
Casual;Jemsek (motion brought by original defendant in action by the debtor in possession with respect to
counterclaim against plaintiff); Keba; Kite I; Kite II; Krakowski; Macquarie; Matheny; Melot I; Melot II;
New Energy; Oracle; Pal-Con; Plum Creek; PNC Bank; Polverari; Posey; Raval; Ricoh I; Romo; Rosen;
Scarcelli; TCB; Tee-Smith.
208Adams, Cary, Chesapeake; Cushman; Greektown; R2D2; Schroder; Seacor; Shaffer.
209 Applewood; Herendeen; Petrano; West. Many local rules explicitly invite a bankruptcy judge to
move to withdraw the motion sua sponte. See, e.g., Ariz. L.B.R. 5011.2(b); N.D. Cal. L.B.R. 5011-2(b);
N.D. Ga. L.B.R. 5011-1(b); N.D. Miss. & S.D. Miss. L.B.R. 5011-1(a)(2); D. Mont. L.B.R. 5011-1(b).
2 1 0Lucas.
211Advanced Telecommunication; Al Dosari; Alabama/Main; Allen; Applewood; Archdiocese II; Arzt;
Atlas; Baldi; Bell Builders; Berg; BF Saul; Biesiada; Billet; Bonarrigo; Borton; Brown; Brown-Minneapolis;
Bullard; Cage; Caillouet; Canal Walk; Chance; Compton; C.R. Stone; Cruickshank; Cyber; Diamond Deci-
sions; Diamond Offshore; Dreier; Engelhart; Energy Conversion; Erchonia; Flaxer; Gould; Gowdy; Greek-
town; Hearthwood; Herendeen; Hess; Home Casual; Howrey I; Howrey II; Howrey III; Howrey IV; Howrey V;
Howrey VI; Howrey VII; H&P; IH;Jubber, Kretz; Laikin; Lancaster; Lengyel; Lisenby; LLS I; LLS II; LLS
III; LLS IV; LLS V; LLS VI; LLS VII: LLS VIII; LLS IX; LLS X; Logan; Lucas; Magnificent; Majestic;
Mansmann; McGuire; McKean; Mcloba; McZeal; Motamedi; Nakamura; Newhouse; NMFC; Ogier;
Okechuku; Pal-Con; Panther I; Panther II; Parriott; Peterson; PNC Bank; Polverari; Posey; Pressman;
Prevost; Pry; Pulsifer I; Pulsifer II; Raimondo; Raval; Refco; Renco; Ricoh II; Roll Tide I; Roll Tide II; Romo;
Rosales; R2D2; SageCrest I; SageCrest II; Santa Barbara; Schwab; Slobodian; Spencer; Springel I; Springel
II; Steege; Stevenson; Swinson; Taicom; TCB; THQ; Timco; Triad Group; Triad Pharmaceuticals; Vaccaro;
Vanderpol; Viera; Villages; Villegas; Wagner I; Wagner II; Wagner III; Warren; West; Wilenchik; Williams I;
Williams II; Williams III; Williams IV, Williams V; Williams VI; Williams VII; Willson; Winkler, Yee-
Smith; Zazzali. Cf. Able Machine Works (trustee originally filed an objection, but then filed a consent
motion to withdraw the reference with movant); Global Gaming (debtor originally opposed motion, then
filed a consent motion); Gold (motion was originally opposed, but parties then filed consent motion); SVS
(objection withdrawn).
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not subsequently withdrawn). 2 12 Because most motions are filed by defend-
ants in actions brought on behalf of the debtor (generally by a trustee), it can
be assumed that generally the trustee is perfectly comfortable litigating in a
federal district court rather than a bankruptcy court and would rather not
fight the defendant over the appropriate forum. Still, it is somewhat surpris-
ing that more than half of all such motions are not opposed, because the
trustee has "home court advantage" in the bankruptcy court in his or her
district and might expect to have a better chance of success in that forum.
In some cases (fifty-four of those in the study) the bankruptcy judge is-
sued a report and recommendation with respect to the motion to the district
court.2 13 Some local bankruptcy rules require such a report and recommenda-
tion in connection with every motion to withdraw the reference.214 Some
bankruptcy courts employ forms for such reports and recommendations.2 15
In one case, having received a motion to withdraw the reference, the district
court referred the motion to a magistrate for a report and recommendation.21 6
Those districts that do not currently require a report and recommenda-
tion on such motions might consider amending their rules to impose such a
requirement. Such a report has two benefits. First, it would force the bank-
ruptcy judge to determine whether the causes of action are core or noncore
matters, and whether they can be heard and determined by the bankruptcy
court. Many of the motions to withdraw the reference are made without the
benefit of a bankruptcy court determination on that issue. Second, it would
provide both the parties and, if necessary, the district court an objective as-
sessment as to whether there is "cause" for a permissive withdrawal, or
2 12ABC; ABN; Adams; Agile I; Agile II; Ansung; Athos; Austin; Azam; Bagley; Barra; Beck; Bell; Calde,
ron; Cary; Chambers; Chesapeake; Clinica; Cobe; Country Fare; Cushman; Desmond; Dick; Edwards; Ever-
green; Federal Housing; Field; Fulbright; Ginzburg; Global Aviation; Grossman; Hauk; Hoskins; IES;
Impeva; Innova; Jemsek; Keba; Kirkland; Kirschenbaum; Kite I; Kite II; Klein; Krakowski; Laddin; Lain;
Lehman I; Lehman II; Lemons; LightSquared; Limor; Locke; Macquarie; Marini; Matheny; McCord; Mc-
Kinstry; Melcher; Melech; Melot I; Melot II; Moglia; Munoz-Flores; Needler; New Energy; New Meatco;
Newman; Ng; Nguyen; Oracle; Parker; Paulo; Petrano; Plum Creek; Prior; Pro-Pac; Ricoh I; Rosen; Saad;
Samson; Scaccianoce; Scarcelli; Schroder; Seacor; Shaffer; Sharp; Shengdatech; Sladky; SNTL; Sojourner;
Stettin; Sun Capital; Texas Sterling; Torchia; Transcontinental; TPG; T3; UPH I; UPH II; UPH III;
USA United; Weiss; WL Homes; Testramski. Cf Adventure Harbor (although no opposition was filed,
movant represented that the defendant objected); Archdiocese I (the debtor in possession did not oppose
the motion, but additional plaintiffs in the underlying proceeding did).
213Alabama/Main; Ansung; Applewood; Beck; Biesiada; Brown; Cage; Chance; Compton; C.R. Stone;
Cushman; Diamond Offshore; Energy Conversion; Englehart; Erchonia; Gould; Hearthwood; Herendeen;
Hess; Howrey I; Howrey II; Howrey III; Howrey IV; Howrey V; Howrey VI; Howrey VII; Keba; Macquarie;
Mansmann; Marini; Mcloba; Motamedi; New Energy; Newhouse; Nguyen; Pal-Con; Parker; Petrano; Press-
man; Santa Barbara; Seacor; Sojourner; TCB; Torchia; Villegas; West; Williams I; Williams II; Williams III;
Williams IV; Williams V; Williams VI; Williams VII; Winkler.
214D. Neb. Gen. Rule 1.5(b)(1); W.D. Okla. L. Cv. R. 81.4(b)(3); N.D. Tex. L.B.R. 5011-1(b); S.D. Tex.
L.B.R. 5011-1.
215Ansung; Brown; Pal-Con; Santa Barbara.
216Swinson.
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whether (if mandatory withdrawal is sought) the proceeding requires sub-
stantial and material consideration of nonbankruptcy law affecting interstate
commerce. If the parties have the benefit of such a report and recommenda-
tion, the party seeking withdrawal of the reference may decide not to pursue
its motion. The report would also facilitate analysis of the motion by the
district court.
5. WHAT WAS THE BASIS OF THE MOTION?
In most cases, 209 of those in the study, the movant invoked only permis-
sive withdrawal under the first sentence of § 157(d).2 17 Six movants sought
withdrawal of the reference solely on the basis of mandatory withdrawal
under the second sentence of 28 U.S.C. § 157(d).21 8 In the rest, when the
movant had a basis for arguing for mandatory withdrawal (or even when
there was no such basis), the movant argued for withdrawal under both
theories.219
In eighty-two cases, the proceeding in which the motion was filed was
related to a proceeding already pending at the district court, or for which
withdrawal was being sought at the same time.220
217ABC; ABN; Adams; Advanced Telecommunication; Adventure Harbor; Agile I; Agile II; Alabama!
Main; Allen; Ansung; Applewood; Archdiocese I; Archdiocese II; Arzt; Atlas; Bagley; Baldi; Bell; Bell Build-
ers; Berg; BF Saul; Biesiada; Billet; Borton; Brown; Brown-Minneapolis; Bullard; Cage; Caillouet; Calderon;
Canal Walk; Cary; Chambers; Chance; Chesapeake; Clinica; Cobe; Compton; CR. Stone; Cushman;
Cyber; Desmond; Diamond Decisions; Dick; Dreier; Engelhart; Erchonia; Evergreen; Field; Flaxer; Fulbright;
Ginzburg; Global Gaming; Gold; Gould; Gowdy; Greektown; Grossman; Hauk; Hearthwood; Herendeen;
Hess; Home Casual; Hoskins; Howrey I; Howrey II; Howrey III; Howrey IV; Howrey V; Howrey V; Howrey
VII; IES; IH; Impeva; Jemsek; Jubber; Kirschenbaum; Kite I; Kite II; Klein; Kretz; Laddin; Laikin; Lain;
Lancaster; Lehman I; Lehman II; Lemons; Lengyel; Limor; Lisenby; LLS I; LLS II; LLS III; LLS IV; LLS V;
LLS VI; LLS VII: LLS VIII; LLS IX; LLS X; Locke; Logan; Lucas; Magnificent; Majestic; Marini; Mc-
Cord; McGuire; Mcloba; McKean; McKinstry; McZeal; Melcher; Melech; Melot I; Melot II; Motamedi;
Munoz-Flores; Nakamura; New Energy; New Meatco; Newhouse; Newman; Ng; Nguyen; NMFC; Ogier;
Okechuku; Oracle; Pal-Con; Panther I; Panther II; Parker; Parriott; Peterson; Petrano; Plum Creek; PNC
Bank; Polverari; Pressman; Prevost; Pro-Pac; Pry; Pulsifer I; Pulsifer II; Raimondo; Refco; Renco; Roll Tide I;
Roll Tide II; Romo; Rosen; Saad; SageCrest I; SageCrest II; Samson; Santa Barbara; Scaccianoce; Scarcelli;
Schroder; Shaffer; Sharp; Shengdatech; Sladky; Slobodian; Sojourner; Spencer; Springel I; Springel II; Steege;
Stettin; Stevenson; Sun Capital; Swinson; Taicom; Texas Sterling; THQ; Timco; Torchia; TPG; T3;
Transcontinental; USA United; Vaccaro; Vanderpol; Viera; Villages; Villegas; Wagner I; Wagner II; Wag-
ner III; Warren; Weiss; West; Wilenchik; Williams I; Williams II; Williams III; WIlliams IV; Williams V;
Williams VI; Williams VII; Willson; Winkler; WL Homes; Testramski; Zazzali. Cf Austin (pro se debtor
did not specify legal basis for motion, but no federal statute was cited).
2 18Diamond Offshore; Federal Housing; Global Aviation; Keba; Macquarie; Seacor.
21
'Al Dosari; Azam; Barra; Beck; Bonarrigo; Country Fare; Edwards; Innova; Kirkland; Krakowski; Light-
Squared; Mansmann; Matheny; Moglia; Needler; Paulo; Posey; Prior; Raval; R2D2; Schwab; SNTL; TCB;
UPH I; UPH II; UPH III; Tee-Smith.
220ABC; Adams; Archdiocese I; Archdiocese II; Baer; Bagley; Bell Builders; Berg; Canal Walk; Cary;
Chambers; Chance; Country Fare; C.R. Stone; Cushman; Diamond Decisions; Diamond Offshore; Hess;
Home Casual; Keba; Kretz; Ladd in; LightSquared; Lisenby; LLS I; LLS II; LLS III; LLS IV; LLS V; LLS
VI; LLS VII: LLS VIII; LLS IX; LLS X; Macquarie; Melot I; Melot II; Motamedi; Nakamura; Oracle; Pal-
Con; Panther II; Petrano; PNC Bank; Polverari; Posey; Prevost; Pulsifer I; Pulsifer II; Ricoh I; Ricoh II; Roll
424
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With respect to mandatory withdrawal, the non-bankruptcy federal laws
cited by the movant as the basis for the motion included the following:
* Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968
* Home Owner Equity Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617
* Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa
* Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp
* Securities Investor Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111
* Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619
* Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1616
* Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x
* Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141n
* Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356a
* Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16
* Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-9834
* Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1191c
* Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4501-
4642
* Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106
* Patent Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 101-390
* Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-165
* Noerr-Pennington doctrine
* False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733
* Civil forfeiture, 18 U.S.C. § 981
* Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIR-
REA), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)
* Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691
* Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA), 50
U.S.C. App. § 2170
* Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. H§ 151-621
When the movant sought permissive withdrawal, in 130 cases one or
more of the causes of action were clearly noncore 221 and could not be decided
by a non-Article III bankruptcy judge absent consent. 222 In thirtyfive cases,
Tide I; Roll Tide II; Rosales; SageCrest I; SageCrest II; Samson; Santa Barbara; Schroder; Shaffer; Spencer;
Springel I; Springel II; SVS; THQ; TPG; T3; UPH I; UPH II; UPH III; Villages; Villegas; Wagner I;
Wagner II; Wagner III; Williams I; Williams II; Williams III; Williams IV; Williams V; Williams VI;
Williams VII; cf. Cyber (case was originally filed in district court and referred to bankruptcy court).
"
1Often the court did not state whether the claims were core or noncore; the assessments that follow
are either those of the court or my own conclusions.
2 22Advanced Telecommunication; Adventure Harbor; Al Dosari; Ansung; Applewood; Archdiocese I;
Archdiocese II; Arzt; Atlas; Bagley; Barra; Beck; Bell; Bell Builders; Berg; BF Saul; Biesiada; Billet; Bonarrigo;
Borton; Brown-Minneapolis; Bullard; Caillouet; Canal Walk; Chesapeake; Clinica; CR. Stone; Cruickshank;
Cushman; Cyber Dick; Dreier; Edwards; Energy Conversion; Erchonia; Evergreen; Field; Fulbright; Global
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one or more of the causes of action were core matters that were unaffected
by Stern.2 2 3 Another two cases involved a state law claim that constituted a
core proceeding and was allegedly governed by Stern.224 Ninety-four cases
involved a fraudulent transfer or fraudulent conveyance, core matters that
most courts have concluded are governed by Stern.2 2 5
6. WAS A JURY TRIAL REQUESTED?
In most of the cases in which withdrawal of the reference was requested
(175 cases out of 253 in the study, or 69%), the movant stated that the
movant had a right to a jury trial of the cause of action at issue.2 26  Indeed,
Gaming; Gould; Gowdy; Greektown; Hauk; Hearthwood; Herendeen; Home Casual; Hoskins; H&P; IES;
IH; Impeva; Innova; Jubber; Kirschenbaum; Kite I; Kite II; Klein; Kretz; Laddin; Laikin; Lehman II; Lengyel;
LightSquared; Limor; Locke; Logan; Magnificent; Majestic; Marini; McGuire; Mcloba; McZeal; Melech;
Melot I; Melot II; Moglia; Nakamura; Ng; NMFC; Okechuku; Pal-Con; Panther I; Panther II; Parker;
Peterson; Petrano; Polverari; Pressman; Prior; Pro-Pac; Pulsifer I; Raval; Refco; Renco; Ricoh I; Roll Tide I;
Roll Tide II; Romo; Rosales; R2D2; Saad; SageCrest I; SageCrest II; Schwab; Sladky; Sojourner; Stettin;
Sun Capital; TCB; Timco; Torchia; TPG; T3; Triad Group; Triad Pharmaceuticals; UPH I; UPH II;
UPH III; Vaccaro; Viera; Villages; Wagner I; Wagner II; Wagner III; Warren; Weiss; Willson; Winkler; WL
Homes; Tee-Smith. Whether the causes of action were core or noncore was unclear in Plum Creek; Ta-
icom; and SNTL, and the issue was not decided by the district court when it ruled on the motion.
Adams, Cary, Schroder; Shaffer; H&P, Majestic; Romo; Santa Barbara; Scaccianoce; Shengdatech;
Steege; Stevenson; SVS; Texas Sterling; Triad Group; Triad Pharmaceuticals and Clinica involved personal
injury tort actions beyond the authority of the bankruptcy court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(0)
and which were required to be tried in the district court pursuant to § 157(b)(5). Applewood involved a
charge of criminal contempt which the bankruptcy judge was not certain he had the authority to try.
... Allen; Calderon; Compton; Gold; Impeva; Krakowski; Lain; Lancaster; Lehman I; Lemons; Limor;
Lisenby; Lucas; Matheny; McCord; McKinstry; Motamedi; Needler; New Energy; Nguyen; Ogier; Oracle;
Paulo; PNC Bank; Pulsifer II; Ricoh II; Rosales; Sladlry; THQ; USA United; cf Grossman; Melcher (involv-
ing sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927); Posey; Rosen; Scarcelli (withdrawal sought as to entire case); but
see New Meatco; Spencer (arguing for withdrawal of a preference action on the basis of Stern). Whether
the causes of action were core or noncore was unclear in Plum Creek; Taicom; and SNTL, and the issue
was not decided by the district court when it ruled on the motion.
22 4Desmond; Jemsek; cf. Global Gaming (although movant claimed to be defendant in counterclaim
under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) in order to cite Stern, movant had not filed a claim in the bankruptcy
case).
...ABC; ABN; Advanced Telecommunication; Agile I; Agile II; Alabama/Main; Athos; Austin; Baldi;
Bell; Bell Builders; Berg; Brown; Brown-Minneapolis; Cage; Canal Walk; Chambers; Cobe; C.R. Stone; Dia-
mond Decisions; Dreier; Engelhart; Field; Flaxer; Ginzburg; Gould; Howrey I; Howrey II; Howrey III; Howrey
IV; Howrey V; Howrey VI; Howrey VII; IH; Jubber; Kirkland; Limor; LLS I; LLS II; LLS III; LLS IV; LLS
V; LLS VI; LLS VII: LLS VIII; LLS IX; LLS X; Marini; McKean; Mcloba; Melech; Moglia; Munoz-
Flores; Newhouse; Newman; Parriott; Prevost; Pry; Raimondo; Renco; Roll Tide I; Roll Tide II; Samson;
Scaccianoce; Sharp; Shengdatech; Slobodian; Springel I; Springel II; Steege; Stettin; Sun Capital; SVS; Swin-
son; Timco; Torchia; Transcontinental; Vanderpol; Villegas; Wagner I; Wagner II; Wagner III; Weiss; West;
Wilenchik; Williams I; Williams II; Williams III; Williams IV; Williams V; Williams VI; Williams VII;
Testramski; Zazzali.
...ABC; ABN; Able Machine Works; Adams; Advanced Telecommunication; Adventure Harbor; Agile
I; Agile II; Al Dosari; Alabama/Main; Archdiocese I; Archdiocese II; Arzt; Athos; Atlas; Azam; Bagley;
Baldi; Barra; Bell; Bell Builders; Berg; Biesiada; Brown; Bonarrigo; Brown-Minneapolis; Bullard; Cage; Cail-
louet; Calderon; Canal Walk; Cary; Chambers; Chance; Clinica; Compton; C.R. Stone; Cruickshank;
Cushman; Diamond Offshore; Dreier; Edwards; Energy Conversion; Engelhart; Erchonia; Evergreen; Field;
2015) MOTIONS TO WITHDRAW THE REFERENCE
some of those movants simply cited 28 U.S.C. § 157(e) 2 2 7 as the basis of their
motion, rather than arguing that there existed "cause" for withdrawal under
§ 157(d).
7. WAS THE MOTION GRANTED OR DENIED?
Of the 253 cases in the study, the court granted the motion to withdraw
the reference in whole or in part in 177 of them (an astonishing 70%).228
This part considers the extent to which the factors described above were
present in the cases in which the motion was granted or denied.
As the following chart demonstrates, motions to withdraw the reference
were far more likely to be granted in the Fifth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits
than in any other. Although the Fifth Circuit had four cases in which it
granted multiple (a total of fifteen) motions to withdraw the reference, it also
had one case in which it denied multiple (three) motions, so the existence of
multiple motions in a single case did not affect the relative percentages. The
Seventh Circuit granted two motions in each of three cases. If one computed
the percentages based on the number of cases in which such motions were
made, the motions would have been granted in ten out of thirteen cases, or
77% of the cases, which would still be the third most in the country.
There is no single explanation why district courts in some circuits are
more willing to grant motions to withdraw the reference. The Fifth Circuit
has a slightly higher percentage of motions that are unopposed (twenty-eight
out of forty-six, or 61%) than the sample as a whole (58%),229 but that is
unlikely to explain the higher rate at which the motions are granted. The
most likely explanation is that the Fifth Circuit has a disproportionate num-
Flaxer; Fulbright; Gold; Gould; Gowdy; Hauk; Hearthwood; Herendeen; Hess; Hoskins; H&P; IES; IH;
Innova; Jemsek; Jubber; Keba; Kite I; Kite II; Klein; Krakowski; Kretz; Laikin; Lain; LightSquared; Limor;
LLS I; LLS II; LLS III; LLS IV; LLS V; LLS VI; LLS VII; LLS VIII; LLS IX; LLS X; Locke; Logan;
Macquarie; Magnificent; Marini; Matheny; McCord; McGuire; McKean; McKinstry; Mcloba; McZeal;
Melech; Moglia; Munoz-Flores; New Energy; New Meatco; Newhouse; Newman; Ng; NMFC; Ogier;
Okechuku; Pal-Con; Panther I; Panther II; Parker; Parriott; Paulo; Peterson; Petrano; Plum Creek; Pressman;
Prevost; Pry; Raimondo; Raval; Refco; Renco; Ricoh I; Roll Tide I; Roll Tide II; Saad; SageCrest I; SageCrest
II; Samson; Scaccianoce; Schroder; Schwab; Seacor; Shaffer; Sharp; Shengdatech; Sojourner; Spencer, Springel
I; Springel II; Steege; Stettin; Stevenson; Sun Capital; SVS; Swinson; Taicom; Torchia; Transcontinental;
Triad Group; Triad Pharmaceuticals; UPH I; UPH II; UPH III; USA United; Vanderpol; Viera; Villegas;
Wagner II; Wagner III; Warren; Weiss; West; Wilenchik; Williams I; Williams II; Williams III; W1liams IV;
Williams V; Williams VI; Williams VII; Willson; Winkler; WL Homes; Testramski.
22728 U.S.C. § 157(e) states that "[i]f the right to a jury trial applies in a proceeding that may be
heard under his section by a bankruptcy judge, the bankruptcy judge may conduct the jur trial if specially
designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court and with the express consent of all the
parties."
228 The cases are listed by circuit below.
2 9See table at notes 274-277 infra. The Fifth Circuit withdrawal motions that were opposed were
Adventure Harbor; Ansung; Barra; Diamond Offshore; Fulbright; Heathwood; Keba; Kite I; Kite II; Mac-
quarie; Nguyen; Parker; Seacor; Sojourner; Texas Sterling; UPH I; UPH II; and UPH III.
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ber of motions granted on the basis of mandatory withdrawal (six of
twelve).230 Perhaps the district courts in the Fifth Circuit have a more gen-
erous interpretation of when withdrawal is required under § 157(d). If those
six motions had been denied rather than granted, the Fifth Circuit would
have had a rate of granting motions to withdraw of only 72% rather than
85%, more in line with the other circuits.
The percentages of motions granted in both the First Circuit and the
Seventh Circuit were higher than they might otherwise have been because
both circuits had multiple cases involving personal injury tort claims that
must be tried in the district court under § 157(b)(5). 23 1 If those motions
were excluded from the statistics, the district courts in the First Circuit
would have granted only three of seven motions presented to them, only
43%. The district courts in the Seventh Circuit would have granted eleven
of fourteen motions for withdrawal, or 79%.
The district courts in the Fifth and Tenth Circuits also are presented
with more motions to withdraw the reference based on a fraudulent transfer
or fraudulent conveyance claims than district courts in all other circuits other
than the Ninth Circuit, and are far more likely to grant such motions than
district court in all other circuits including the Ninth Circuit.2 32 Nine of the
fourteen motions granted by the district courts in the Tenth Circuit involved
fraudulent transfers or fraudulent conveyances,233 and they denied no mo-
tions to withdraw that involved such claims. Fifteen of the thirty-nine mo-
tions granted in the Fifth Circuit were fraudulent transfer claims, 2 3 4 and the
district courts in the Fifth Circuit did not deny any motion that involved a
fraudulent transfer or fraudulent conveyance. Although the Ninth Circuit
had more motions that raised the issue of a fraudulent transfer or fraudulent
conveyance (twenty-eight of sixty-five motions),235 it granted the motion in
only eleven of those. 236
2
oSee note 281 infra. Barra; Diamond Offshore; Keba; Macquarie; Seacor; and TCB are all motions for
mandatory withdrawal granted by a district court in the Fifth Circuit.
231See note 283 infra. First Circuit: Adams; Cary; Schroder; Shaffer. Seventh Circuit: H&P; Triad
Group; Triad Pharmaceuticals.
232See note 223 supra and note 290 infra,
23 3Brown-Minneapolis; Gould; Jubber; SVS; Swinson; Vanderpol; Wagner I; Wagner II; Wagner III.
234Alabama/Maine; Brown; Cage; Engelhart; Mcloba; Newhouse; Villegas; West; Williams I; Williams
II; Williams III; Williams IV; Williams V; Williams VI; Williams IL
23 5ABC; Bell; Berg; Cobe; Diamond Decisions; Field; Ginzburg; Howrey I; Howrey II; Howrey III;
Howrey IV; Howrey V; Howrey VI; Howrey VII; Kirkland; Melech; Munoz-Flores; Parriott; Prevost; Roll
Tide I; Roll Tide II; Samson; Scaccianoce; Sharp; Shengdatech; Torchia; Wilenchik; Zazzali.
236ABC; Berg; Diamond Decisions; Parriott; Prevost; Samson; Scaccianoce; Sharp; Shengdatech;
Wilenchik; Zazzali.
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MOTIONS TO WITHDRAW GRANTED AND DENIED BY CIRCUIT
Circuit 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th tith
Granted 7237 12238 14239 13240 39241 10242 14243 4244 36245 14246 14247
M (64%) (55%) (70%) (76%) (85%) (62.5%) (82%) (67%) (54%) (100%) (74%)
Denied 4248 10249 6250 4251 7252 6253 3254 2255 30256 0 5257
(%) (36%) (45%) (30%) (24%) (15%) (37.5%) (18%) (33%) (46%) (0%) (26%)
The chart shows, however, that in every circuit motions to withdraw the
reference are granted more than half the time. The same pattern holds true
237Adams, Atlas; Cary, C.R. Stone; Cruickshank; Schroder; Shaffer.
... Billet; Country Fare; Dreier; Federal Housing; Flaxer; Kirschenbaum; LightSquared; Polverari; Refco;
Renco; SageCrest I; SageCrest II.
2391H; Innova; Kretz; Lengyel; Majestic; Okechuku; Peterson; Pressman; Raval; Schwab; Slobodian;
TH.; Transcontinental; WL Homes (docket does not show an order granting motion, but includes
subsequent order referring adversary proceeding back to bankruptcy court for pretrial matters).
240Al Dosari; Applewood; Arzt; Bell Builders; BF Saul; Bullard; Canal Walk; McGuire; NMFC; Plum
Creek; Spencer; Viera; Warren. The court in Viera never entered an order granting the motion, but it was
not opposed and the district court proceeded to adjudicate the adversary proceeding.
2 41Adventure Harbor; Alabama/Main; Ansung; Barra; Biesiada; Brown; Cage; Caillouet; Compton;
Diamond Offshore; Engelhart; Erchonia; Global Gaming; Hearthwood; Keba; Kite I; Kite II; Macquarie;
Magnificent; Mcloba; Motamedi; Nakamura; Newhouse; Pal-Con; Parker; Romo; Santa Barbara; Seacor;
Sojourner; TCB; Villegas; West; Williams I; Williams II; Williams III; WIlliams IV; Williams V; Williams
VI; Williams VII. In Keba and Macquarie, the district court stayed the case and administratively closed it
until it was ready for trial, maintaining the reference with the bankruptcy court for pretrial proceedings.
The order in Mcloba stated that the motion 'will be granted upon certification by the bankruptcy judge
that the parties are read for trial."
2 42Chambers; Cyber; Energy Conversion; Greektown; Laikin; Lucas; McKinstry; Posey; Timco; Villages
2 43Archdiocese I; Archdiocese II; Baldi; Desmond; Home Casual; H&P; Moglia; PNC Bank; Pry;
Pulsifer I; Pulsifer II; Steege; Triad Group; Triad Pharmaceuticals.
2 44Panther I; Panther II; Willson; Winkler.
2 4
SABC; Bagley; Berg; Borton; Clinica; Cushman; Diamond Decisions; Dick; Evergreen; Hoskins; IES;
Klein; Lancaster; LLS I; LLS II; LLS III; LLS IV; LLS V; LLS VI; LLS VII: LLS VIII; LLS IX; LLS X;
Marini; Melcher; Oracle; Parriott; Prevost; Rosales (granted as to noncore issues only); Samson; Scaccianoce;
Sharp; Shengdatech; Taicom; Wilenchik; Zazzali. After granting the motion with respect to two claims in
IES, the district court granted relief under F.R.C.P. 60(b) and referred the claims back to the bankruptcy
court, concluding that the movant had consented to have the claims adjudicated by the bankruptcy court.
1 4'Brown-Minneapolis; Chance; Gould; Hess; Jubber; Melot I; Melot II; SVS; Swinson; Vanderpol;
Wagner I; Wagner II; Wagner III; Tee-Smith.
2 47ABN; Agile I; Agile II; Beck; Gowdy; Herendeen; Laddin; Lisenby; Mansmann; McKean; Newman;
Petrano; Raimondo; Stettin.
2 48Ng; Scarcelli; Weiss; Yestramski.
2 49Global Aviation; Krakowski; Lehman I; Lehman II; McCord; Ricoh I; Ricoh II; TPG; T3; USA
United;
2 50Allen; Bonarrigo; Matheny; Springel I; Springel II; Sun Capital.
"'Chesapeake; Gold; Jemsek; Lemons.
2 52Able Machine Works; Fulbright; Nguyen; Texas Sterling; UPH I; UPH II; UPH III.
2 53Austin; Grossman; Hauk; Lain; Limor; Logan.
2 14Athos; New Energy; Pro-Pac.
2 55 Calderon; Needler.
2
'6Azam; Bell; Cobe; Edwards; Field; Ginzburg; Howrey I; Howrey II; Howrey III; Howrey IV; Howrey
V; Howrey VI; Howrey VII; Impeva; Kirkland; Locke; McZeal; Melech; Munoz-Flores; New Meatco; Paulo;
Prior; Roll Tide I; Roll Tide II; Rosales (denied as to core issue); R2D2; Sladlky; SNTL; Torchia; Vaccaro.
257Advanced Telecommunication; Ogier; Rosen; Saad; Stevenson.
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at the district level, for those districts in which four or more motions were
made. As the following chart demonstrates, in only five such districts was a
motion to withdraw denied more often than granted.
PERCENTAGE OF MOTIONS GRANTED BY CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT
Circuit and District Number of Motions Number Granted %
1st Circuit 11 7 64%
D. Mass. 9258 6259 67%
2nd Circuit 22 12 55%
D. Conn. 4260 4261 100%
E.D.N.Y. 5262 2263 40%
S.D.N.Y. 13264 6265 46%
3rd Circuit 20 14 70%
D. Del. 6266 4267 67%
D.NJ. 6268 5269 83%
M.D. Pa. 5270 4271 80%
4th Circuit 17 13 76%
D. Md. 6272 6273 100%
5th Circuit 46 39 85%
E.D. La. 4274 3275 75%
N. D. Tex. 9276 9277 100%
S.D. Tex. 20278 19279 95%
258Adams; Cary; C.R. Stone; Cruickshank; Ng; Schroder; Shaffer; Weiss; Testramski.
2 59Addms; 7ary; C.R. Stone; Cruickshank; Schroder; Shaffer.
26COUntry Fare; Polverari; SageCrest I; SageCrest II.
26 1Country Fare; Polverari; SageCrest I; SageCrest II.
262Billet; Global Aviation; Kirschenbaum; McCord; USA United.
263Billet; Kirschenbaum.
26 4Dreier; Federal Housing; Flaxer; Krakowski; Lehman I; Lehman II; LightSquared; Refco; Renco; Ricoh
I; Ricoh II; TPG; T3.
2 6sDreier; Federal Housing; Flaxer; LightSquared; Refco; Renco.
"IH; Majestic; Matheny; Sun Capital; THQ; WL Homes.
1 671H; Majestic; THQ; WL Homes.
z
6
sAllen; Innova; Kretz; Okechuku; Peterson; Raval.
56 9Innova; Kretz; Okechuku; Peterson; Raval.
2 70Bonarrigo; Lengyel; Schwab; Slobodian; Transcontinental.
5
'
7 Lengyel; Schwab; Slobodian; Transcontinental.
2 72Al Dosari; Bell Builders; BF Saul; Bullard; Canal Walk; Spencer.
1 7'Al Dosari; Bell Builders; BF Saul; Bullard; Canal Walk; Spencer.
2 74Able Machine Works; Adventure Harbor; Caillouet; Magnificent.
1 7 5Adventure Harbor; Caillouet; Magnificent.
M*Ansung; Brown; Erchonia; Hearthwood; Mcloba; Newhouse; Pal-Con; Santa Barbara; Sojourner.
'
77Ansung; Brown; Erchonia; Hearthwood; Mcloba; Newhouse; Pal-Con; Santa Barbara; Sojourner.
27 Alabama/Main; Biesiada; Cage; Compton; Diamond Offshore; Englehart; Keba; Macquarie;
Motamedi; Nguyen; Seacor; Villegas; West; Williams I; Williams II; Williams III; Williams IV; Williams V;
Williams VI; Williams VII.
279Alabama/Main; Biesiada; Cage; Compton; Diamond Offshore; Englehart; Keba; Macquarie;
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W.D. Tex. 8280 3281 37.5%
6th Circuit 16 10 62.5%
E.D. Mich. 7282 4283 57%
7th Circuit 17 14 82%
N.D. Ill. 6284 5285 83%
E.D. Wis. 8286 7287 87.5%
8th Circuit 6 4 67%
9th Circuit 65 36 54%
D. Ariz. 5288 3289 60%
E.D. Cal. 4290 2291 50%
C.D. Cal. 17292 6293 35%
N.D. Cal. 15294 4295 27%
D. Nev. 8296 7297 87.5%
W.D. Wash. 13298 13299 100%
10th Circuit 14 14 100%
D.N.M. 6300 6301 100%
11th Circuit 19 14 74%
S.D. Fla. 10302 8303 80%
Motamedi; Seacor; Villegas; West; Williams I; Williams II; Williams III; Williams IV; Williams V; Williams
VI; Williams VII.
2801arra; Fulbright; Nakamura; Romo; Texas Sterling; UPH I; UPH II; UPH III.
28 1Barra; Nakamura; Romo.
282Austin; Chambers; Energy Conversion; Greektown; Hauk; Timco; Villages.
28 3Chambers; Energy Conversion; Timco; Villages.
284Athos; Baldi; Desmond; Moglia; PNC Bank; Steege.
28 5Baldi; Desmond; Moglia; PNC Bank; Steege.
28 6Archdiocese I; Archdiocese II; H&P; Pro-Pac; Pulsifer I; Pulsifer II; Triad Group; Triad
Pharmaceuticals.
287Archdiocese I; Archdiocese 1I; H&P; Pulsifer I; Pulsifer II; Triad Group; Triad Pharmaceuticals.
28 8Clinica; Lancaster; Roll Tide I; Roll Tide II; Wilenchik.
28 9Clinica; Lancaster; Wilenchik.
2
"Bell; Dick; Prior; Sharp.
29 1Dick; Sharp.
292Azam; Cobe; Diamond Decisions; Edwards; Evergreen; Ginzburg; IES; Kirkland; Klein; McZeal;
Munoz-Flores; New Meatco; Oracle; Paulo; R2D2; Scaccianoce; SNTL.
29 3Diamond Decisions; Evergreen; IES; Klein; Oracle; Scaccianoce.
294Hoskins; Howrey I; Howrey II; Howrey III; Howrey IV; Howrey V; Howrey VI; Howrey VII; Impeva;
Melcher; Rosales; Slad ky; Taicom; Torchia; Vaccaro.
2951-oskins; Melcher; Rosales; Taicom.
296Bagley; Borton; Cushrman; Locke; Marini; Melech; Parriott; Shengdatech.
297Bagley; Borton; Cushman; Marini; Melech; Parriott; Shengdatech.
29 8ABC; Berg; LLS I; LLS II; LLS III; LLS IV; LLS V; LLS VI; LLS VII: LLS VIII; LLS IX; LLS X;
Prevost.
2 0ABC; Berg; LLS I; LLS II; LLS III; LLS IV; LLS V; LLS VI; LLS VII: LLS VIII; LLS IX; LLS X;
Prevost.
"Brown-Minneapolis; Melot I; Melot II; Wagner I; Wagner II; Wagner III.
soiBrown-Minneapolis; Melot I; Melot II; Wagner I; Wagner II; Wagner III.
3 02ABN; Agile I; Agile II; Gowdy; McKean; Newman; Raimondo; Rosen; Saad; Stettin.
3 03ABN; Agile I; Agile II; Gowdy; McKean; Newman; Raimondo; Stettin.
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District courts are slightly more likely to grant motions filed in chapter 7
cases than those in chapter 11 cases, but the percentages are quite close.304
Perhaps more surprising is how often motions are granted in chapter 13 cases
(although the total number of chapter 13 cases in which motions are made is
low). With the exception of chapter 12 cases (of which there are so few as to
make the figures statistically unreliable), motions are far more likely to be
granted than denied in cases brought under all chapters.
MOTIONS GRANTED AND DENIED BY CHAPTER OF CASE
Chapter 7 11 12 13 15
Motion Granted 7830s 90306 1307 9308 1309
(%) (73%) (71%) (33%) (69%) (100%)
Motion Denied 29310 36311 2312 7313 0
( (27%) (29%) (67%) (31%) (0%)
The district courts withdrew all proceedings when withdrawal was
sought by the bankruptcy judge or United States Trustee. Courts are
considerably more likely to grant a motion filed by a bankruptcy trustee (or
3 04 Plum Creek was not connected to a pending bankruptcy case.
sosAl Dosari; Alabama/Main; Arzt; Atlas; Baldi; Bell Builders; BF Saul; Biesiada; Billet; Borton; Brown-
Minneapolis; Bullard; Cage; Caillouet; Canal Walk; Chambers; Chance; C.R. Stone; Cruickshank;
Desmond; Diamond Decisions; Engelhart; Gould; Gowdy; Greektown; Herendeen; Hess; Home Casual;
Hoskins; IH;Jubber; Kirkland; Kirschenbaum; Laikin; Lisenby; Lucas; McGuire; Melcher; Melot I; Melot II;
Moglia; Munoz-Flores; Newhouse; NMFC; Okechuku; Oracle; Pal-Con; Parker; Peterson; PNC Bank;
Polverari; Pressman; Pry; Renco; Romo; Samson; Schwab; Slobodian; Spencer; Steege; SVS; Swinson;
Vanderpol; Viera; Villegas; West; Wilenchik; Williams I; Williams II; Williams III; Williams IV;
Williams V; Williams VI; Williams VII; Willson; WL Homes; Yee-Smith.
so
6ABC; ABN; Adams; Adventure Harbor; Agile I; Agile II; Ansung; Applewood; Archdiocese I;
Archdiocese II; Bagley; Barra; Berg; Brown; Cary; Clinica; Compton; Country Fare; Cushman; Cyber;
Diamond Offshore; Dick; Dreier; Energy Conversion; Erchonia; Evergreen; Federal Housing; Flaxer; Global
Gaming; Hearthwood; H&P; IES; Innova; Keba; Kite I; Kite II; Klein; Laddin; LightSquared; LLS I; LLS II;
LLS III; LLS IV; LLS V; LLS VI; LLS VII: LLS VIII; LLS IX; LLS X; Macquarie; Magnificent; Majestic;
Marini; McKean; McKinstry; Mcloba; Motamedi; Newman; Panther I; Panther II; Parriott; Posey; Prevost;
Raimondo; Raval; Refco; SageCrest I; SageCrest II; Santa Barbara; Scaccianoce; Schroder; Seacor; Shaffer;
Sharp; Shengdatech; Sojourner; Stettin; TCB; THQ Timco; Transcontinental; Triad Group; Triad
Pharmaceuticals; Villages; Wagner I; Wagner II; Wagner III; Warren; Winkler; Zazzali.
so
7Petrano.
"osBeck; Kretz; Lancaster; Lengyel; Mansmann; Nakamura; Pulsifer I; Pulsifer II; Rosales (granted as to
noncore issues).
3 Taicom.
"'oAble Machine Works; Athos; Austin; Bonarrigo; Chesapeake; Cobe; Field; Ginzburg; Gold;
Grossman; Limor; Logan; McCord; Melech; Ng; Nguyen; Ogier; Saad; Sladlky; Stevenson; Sun Capital;
Torchia; TPG; T3; USA United; Weiss; Yestramski.
"Advanced Telecommunication; Allen; Fulbright; Global Aviation; Howrey I; Howrey II; Howrey III;
Howrey IV; Howrey V; Howrey VI; Howrey VII; Impeva; Jemsek; Krakowski; Lain; Lehman I; Lehman II;
Locke; Matheny; Needler; New Energy; New Meatco; Prior; Pro-Pac; Ricoh I; Ricoh II; Roll Tide I; Roll Tide
II; Rosen; R2D2; Scarcelli; SNTL; Springel I; Springel II; Texas Sterling; UPH I; UPH II; UPH III.
3
"Hauk; Lemons.
"'Azam; Calderon; Edwards; McZeal; Paulo; Rosales (denied as to core issue); Vaccaro.
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liquidating trustee or foreign representative) than another party, including
the debtor or debtor in possession. There may be a degree of familiarity and
trust that is built up between the bankruptcy trustees and the district judges
within a district that encourages the district courts to grant motions brought
by the trustees. Although the district courts grant a majority of motions
brought by debtors, the court is much less likely to grant a motion filed by a
pro se litigant than one represented by counsel.31 4
Although most motions to withdraw the reference are filed by defendants
in adversary proceedings commenced by the trustee or debtor in possession
or debtor, surprisingly the district courts were more likely to grant motions
brought by a nondebtor party who was the plaintiff in an action against the
debtor than one brought by a nondebtor party who was a defendant. As one
might have expected, if the litigation did not involve the debtor at all, but
was merely related to the bankruptcy case, the district court was very likely
to grant a motion to withdraw the reference.
MOTIONS GRANTED AND DENIED BY PARTY SEEKING WITHDRAWAL
Party Seeking Withdrawal Granted Denied
Trustee or 28315 4316
Foreign Representative (87%) (13%)
Debtor in possession or 7317 3318
Reorganized debtor (70%) (30%)
Debtor 7319 6320
(54%) (46%)
Defendant in action by trustee, DIP 105321 52322
or debtor (67%) (33%)
Plaintiff in action against debtor 26323 9324
(74%) (26%)
3 14 Compare Austin; Edwards; Paulo; Rosen (motion denied) with Dick (motion granted). Cf Melcher;
Melot I; Melot II; Parker (motion granted when opposed by pro se defendants).
3
"Brown-Minneapolis; Caillouet; Chambers; Desmond; IH; Laddin; LLS I; LLS II; LLS III; LLS IV;
LLS V; LLS VI; LLS VII. LLS VIII; LLS IX; LLS X; Magnificent; McKinstry; Melcher; Renco; Slobodian;
Taicom; Timco; Transcontinental (liquidating agent); Warren; Willson; Winkler; Zazzali.
"
1 6Limor; Ogier; Stevenson; Sun Capital.
31 7Country Fare; H&P; Majestic; Motamedi; THQ Triad Group; Triad Pharmaceuticals.
""Advanced Telecommunication; Needler; Texas Sterling.
319Borton; Dick; Kretz; Lengyel; Mansmann; Nakamura; Pulsifer II.
320Austin; Azam; Bonarrigo; Edwards; Hauk; Paulo.
32 1ABC; ABN; Ansung; Agile I; Agile II; Alabama/Main; Archdiocese I; Archdiocese II; Arzt; Atlas;
Bagley; Baldi; Barra; Beck; Bell Builders; Berg; BF Saul; Biesiada; Billet; Brown; Bullard; Cage; Canal Walk;
Chance; Clinica; Compton; C.R. Stone; Cruickshank; Diamond Decisions; Dreier; Energy Conversion;
Engelhart; Evergreen; Flaxer; Global Gaming; Gould; Gowdy; Hearthwood; Hess; Hoskins; JES; Innova;
Jubber; Kirschenbaun; Klein; Laikin; Lancaster; LightSquared; Lisenby; Marini; McGuire; McKean;
Mcloba; Moglia; Nakamura; Newhouse; Newman; NMFC; Okechuku; Panther I; Panther II; Parker;
Parriott; Peterson; Pressman; Prevost; Pry; Pulsifer I; Raimondo; Refco; Rosales (granted as to noncore
issues); SageCrest I; SageCrest II; Samson; Scaccianoce; Schwab; Sharp; Shengdatech; Sojourner; Spencer;
Steege; Stettin; SVS; Swinson; Taicom; THZ; Viera; Villages; Villegas; Wagner I; Wagner II; Wagner III;
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Party in action not involving 6325 2326
trustee, DIP or debtor (75%) (25%)
Bankruptcy Judge or U.S. Trustee 5327 0
(100%) (0%)
It is not at all surprising that motions are far more likely to be granted if
they are unopposed than if they are opposed. Indeed, often the district courts
grant the unopposed motion without discussing whether "cause" exists for
withdrawal as required by § 157(d) if the parties have agreed to litigate at
the district court rather than the bankruptcy court. Although most motions
that are opposed are denied, almost as many are granted.
MOTIONS GRANTED AND DENIED BY WHETHER THEY WERE OPPOSED
Opposed Unopposed
Motion Granted 57328 121329
Motion Denied 62330 14331
Warren; Wilenchik; Williams I; Williams II; Williams III; Williams IV; Williams V; Williams VI; Williams
VII; Winkler; WL Homes; Zazzali.
322Able Machine Works; Athos; Bell; Calderon; Cobe; Field; Ginzburg; Global Aviation; Gold;
Grossman; Howrey I; Howrey II; Howrey III; Howrey IV; Howrey V; Howrey VI; Howrey VII; Impeva;
Kirkland; Lain; Lehman I; Lehman II; Lemons; Locke; Logan; McCord; McZeal; Melech; Munoz-Flores; New
Meatco; Ng; Nguyen; Plum Creek; Pro-Pac; Ricoh II; Roll Tide I; Roll Tide II; Rosales (denied as to core
issue); Saad; Sladky; SNTL; Springel I; Springel II; Torchia; TPG; T3; UPH I; UPH II; UPH III; USA
United; Vaccaro; Vanderpol; Weiss; Testramski.
3 23Adventure Harbor; Al Dosari; Allen; Cyber; Diamond Offshore; Erchonia; Federal Housing; Home
Casual; Keba; Kite I; Kite II; Macquarie; Melot I; Melot II; Oracle; Pal-Con; PNC Bank; Polverari; Posey;
Raval; Romo; Santa Barbara; Tee-Smith.
324Fulbright; Jemsek (counterclaim in action originally brought by trustee); Krakowski; Matheny; New
Energy; Prior; Ricoh I; Rosen; Scarcelli; Seacor; TCB.
"-'Adams; Cary; Cushman; Greektown; Schroeder; Shaffer.
"'Chesapeake; R2D2.
3 27Applewood; Herendeen; Lucas; Petrano; West.
3 28ABN; Adams; Adventure Harbor; Agile I; Agile II; Ansung; Archdiocese I (opposed only by plaintiffs
other than debtor); Bagley; Barra; Beck; Cary; Chambers; Clinica; Country Fare; Cushman; Desmond;
Diamond Offshore; Dick; Evergreen; Federal Housing; Hoskins; H&P; Kirschenbaum; Klein; Laddin;
LightSquared; Schroder; Shaffer; H&P; Hearthwood; IES; Innova; Keba; Kite I; Kite II; Macquarie; Marini;
McKinstry; Melcher; Melot II; Moglia; Newman; Oracle; Parker; Petrano; Plum Creek; Rosales (granted as
to noncore issues); Samson; Scaccianoce; Seacor; Sharp; Shengdatech; Sojourner; Stettin; Transcontinental;
Triad Group; Triad Pharmaceuticals; WL Homes.
3 29ABC; Al Dosari; Alabama/Main; Applewood; Archdiocese II; Arzt; Atlas; Baldi; Bell Builders; Berg;
BF Saul; Biesiada; Billet; Borton; Brown; Brown-Minneapolis; Bullard; Cage; Caillouet; Canal Walk; Chance;
Compton; C.R. Stone; Cruickshank; Cyber Diamond Decisions; Dreier; Energy Conversion; Engelhart;
Erchonia; Flaxer; Global Gaming; Gould; Gowdy; Greektown; Herendeen; Hess; Home Casual; IH; Jubber;
Kretz; Laikin; Lancaster; Lengyel; Lisenby; LLS I; LLS II; LLS III; LLS IV; LLS V; LLS VI; LLS VII: LLS
VIII; LLS IX; LLS X; Lucas; Magnificent; Majestic; Mansmann; McGuire; McKean; Mcloba; Melot I
(motion for reconsideration filed and denied); Motamedi; Nakamura; Newhouse; NMFC; Okechuku; Pal-
Con; Panther I; Panther II; Parriott; Peterson; PNC Bank; Polverari; Posey; Pressman; Prevost; Pry; Pulsifer
I; Pulsifer II; Raimondo; Raval; Refco; Renco; Romo; SageCrest I; SageCrest II; Santa Barbara; Schwab;
Slobodian; Spencer; Steege; SVS; Swinson; TCB; Taicom; TH; Timco; Vanderpol; Viera; Villages;
434
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If the bankruptcy judge or magistrate made a recommendation to the
district court with respect to the motion, the district court always resolved
the motion consistent with that recommendation. In forty-three cases3 32 that
recommendation was to withdraw the reference; in ten cases3 3  that
recommendation was to deny the motion to withdraw. The deference shown
to the judgment of the bankruptcy judge suggests that such reports and
recommendations are of great value to the district court judges in dealing
with motions to withdraw the reference. Those districts that do not require
such reports from the bankruptcy judge in connection with every motion to
withdraw the reference should consider amending their local rules to impose
such a requirement. Bankruptcy judges who sit in districts where no such
report is required should be encouraged to generate such a report for every
motion filed in their cases.
Although the district court is required to withdraw the reference of a
proceeding under the second sentence of § 157(d) if "the court determines
that resolution of the proceeding requires consideration of both title 11 and
other laws of the United States regulating organizations or activities
affecting interstate commerce," in only two-thirds of the cases in which the
movant claimed withdrawal was required under this provision did the court
actually grant the motion for mandatory withdrawal. This is undoubtedly
due to the non-statutory gloss uniformly placed on the provision, requiring
not merely "consideration" of non-bankruptcy federal laws, but "substantial
and material consideration" (as opposed to simple application) of such laws.33 4
Villegas; Wagner I; Wagner II; Wagner III; Warren; West; Wilenchik; Williams I; Williams 11; Williams III;
Williams IV; Williams V; Williams VI; Williams VII; Willson; Winkler; Yee-Smith; Zazzali.
.. oAthos; Austin; Azam; Bell; Calderon; Chesapeake; Cobe; Edwards; Field; Fulbright; Ginzburg; Global
Aviation; Grossman; Hauk; Hearthwood; Howrey I; Howrey II; Howrey III; Howrey IV; Howrey V; Howrey
VI; Howrey VII; Impeva; Jemsek; Kirkland; Krakowski; Lain; Lehman I; Lehman II; Lemons; Limor; Locke;
Matheny; McCord; Melech; Munoz-Flores; Needler; New Energy; New Meatco; Ng; Nguyen; Paulo; Prior;
Pro-Pac; Ricoh I; Rosales (denied as to core issue); Rosen; Scarcelli; Sladly; SNTL; Springel I; Springel II;
Sun Capital; Texas Sterling; Torchia; TPG; T3; UPH I; UPH II; UPH III; USA United; Weiss;
Testramski.
"'Able Machine Works; Advanced Telecommunication; Allen (no opposition papers filed but attorney
participated in hearing); Bonarrigo; Logan; McZeal; Ogier; Ricoh II; Roll Tide I; Roll Tide II; R2D2;
Stevenson; Vaccaro.
... Alabama/Main; Ansung; Applewood; Beck; Biesiada; Brown; Chance; Compton; C.R. Stone;
Diamond Offshore; Energy Conversion; Engelhart; Erchonia; Cold; Gould; Hearthwood; Herendeen; Hess;
Keba; Macquarie; Mansmann; Marini; Mcloba; Motamedi; Newhouse; Pal-Con; Parker; Petrano; Pressman;
Santa Barbara; Seacor; Sojourner; Swinson; TCB; Villegas; West; Williams I; Williams II; Williams III;
Williams IV; Williams V; Williams VI; Williams VII; Winkler. In Keba and Macquarie the district court
did not explicitly grant the motion, although it purported to follow the recommendation of the bankruptcy
court by staying the civil proceeding at the district court and administratively closing it until the cases
were ready for trial,
...New Energy; Howrey I; Howrey II; Howrey III; Howrey IV, Howrey V; Howrey VI; Howrey VII;
Nguyen; Torchia;
.. See discussion at notes 79-80 supra.
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If the movant sought permissive withdrawal of what appeared to be a
noncore matter, 3 5 the district court was naturally more likely to grant the
motion than if the motion related to a core matter or a Stern-type claim
(although many cases presented both noncore matters and core matters, both
non-Stern and Stern-type core matters). Perhaps the most unexpected fact
the data presents is that even in core matters that are not affected by Stern,
which by definition go to the essence of a bankruptcy court's jurisdiction, the
district court granted motions to withdraw the reference in fourteen of
thirty-nine motions, or 36% of those requests.
The numbers support the assumption that fraudulent transfer or
fraudulent conveyance claims have become a major source of motions to
withdraw the reference and that district courts, unwilling to assume that the
Supreme Court will distinguish between the § 157(b)(2)(C) counterclaim at
issue in Stern and "proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent
conveyances" under § 157(b)(2)(H), are granting more than 70% of those
motions. But even if the district courts interpret Stern to limit the ability of
bankruptcy judges to enter final judgments in fraudulent conveyance actions,
one might assume that district court judges would recognize that bankruptcy
judges have far more experience dealing with fraudulent conveyance actions,
and would therefore allow the proceedings to remain with the bankruptcy
court until the bankruptcy judge issued proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law, or until the case was ready for a jury trial (when the
defendant was entitled to, and had requested, a jury trial). That seems not to
be the case.
MOTIONS GRANTED AND DENIED BASED ON NATURE OF CLAIM
Mandatory Permissive Withdrawal
Withdrawal Noncore Core-Non-Stern Core-Stem
Motion Granted 12336 104337 14338 72
Motion Denied 6340 35341 25342 28343
3 55The bankruptcy court did not always specify whether the proceeding was core or noncore. If
neither the bankruptcy court nor the district court so specified, I made my own judgment based on the
nature of the claims.
... Barra (RICO); Beck (Truth in Lending Act); Country Fare and Raval (Lanham Act); Diamond
Offshore (Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act); Federal Housing (Housing and Economic Recovery Act of
2008); Keba, Macquarie and Seacor (Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act); TCB (Equal Credit
Opportunity Act); SVS (FINSA); Tee-Smith (Securities Act of 1933, Securities Exchange Act of 1934);
cf. Moglia (suggesting that mandatory withdrawal would probably be appropriate based on claims under
the Internal Revenue Code, but withdrawing the reference under the permissive clause).
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In forty-six out of sixty-two cases (74%) in which a related case was
already pending at the district court (or movants sought withdrawal in
multiple related cases), the court granted the motion for withdrawal.344 This
"
7Adams; Adventure Harbor; Al Dosari (noncore claims predominated, although one core claim-
seeking a determination of nondischargeability of the damages awarded on the noncore claims-was
included); Ansung; Applewood; Archdiocese I; Archdiocese II; Arzt; Atlas; Baer; Bagley; Barra; Bell Builders;
Berg; BF Saul; Biesiada; Billet; Borton; Brown-Minneapolis; Bullard; Caillouet; Cary; Chance; Clinica; C.R.
Stone; Cushman; Cyber; Dick; Dreier; Energy Conversion; Erchonia; Evergreen; Global Gaming; Gould;
Gowdy; Greektown; Hearthwood; Herendeen; Hess; Home Casual; Hoskins; H&P; IES; IH; Innova; Jubber;
Kirschenbaum; Kite I; Kite II; Klein; Kretz; Laddin; Laikin; Lengyel; LightSquared; Magnificent; Majestic;
Mansmann; Marini; McGuire; Mcloba; Melot I; Melot II; Moglia; Nakamura; NMFC; Okechuku; Pal-
Con; Panther I; Panther II; Parker; Peterson; Petrano; Polverari; Pressman; Pulsifer I; Raval; Refco; Renco;
Romo; Rosales; SageCrest I; SageCrest II; Santa Barbara; Scaccianoce; Schroder; Schwab; Shaffer;
Shengdatech; Sojourner, Steege; TCB; Timco; Triad Group; Triad Pharmaceuticals; Viera; Villages; Wagner
I; Wagner II; Wagner III; Warren; Willson; Winkler; WL Homes; Yee-Smith. It was unclear whether the
claims in Plum Creek and Taicom were core or noncore, although the motion to withdraw was granted.
Although the personal injury tort claims at issue in Adams, Cary, Schroder; Shaffer; Clinica; H&P;
Triad Group; and Triad Pharmaceuticals were noncore, under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) the district court
was required to order them tried in a district court. Romo involved the dischargeability of a personal
injury tort claim; the issue of dischargeability is clearly core, but the personal injury tort claim was
noncore.
138Compton; C.R. Stone; Lancaster; Lisenby; Lucas; McKinstry; Melcher; Motamedi; Oracle; PNC
Bank; Posey; Pulsifer II; THQ It was unclear whether the claims in Plum Creek and Taicom were core or
noncore, although the motion to withdraw was granted.
3 59ABC; ABN; Agile I; Agile II; Alabama/Main; Baldi; Bell Builders; Berg; Brown; Brown-Minneapolis;
Cage; Canal Walk; Chambers; C.R. Stone; Cruickshank; Desmond; Diamond Decisions; Dreier; Engelhart;
Flaxer; Global Gaming (movant asserted that ordinary counterclaim was a Stern counterclaim); Gould; IH;
Jubber; LLS I; LLS II; LLS III; LLS IV; LLS V; LLS VI; LLS VII: LLS VIII; LLS IX; LLS X; Marini;
McKean; Mcloba; Moglia; Newhouse; Newman; Parriott; Stevenson; Prevost; Pry; Raimondo; Renco;
Samson; Scaccianoce; Sharp; Shengdatech; Slobodian; Spencer (treated preference as a Stern claim); Steege;
Stettin; SVS; Swinson; TCB; Timco; Transcontinental; Vanderpol; Villegas; Wagner I; Wagner II; Wagner
III; West; Wilenchik; Williams I; Williams II; Williams III; Williams IV; Williams V; Williams VI;
Williams VII; Zazzali.
3 40Al Dosari; Bonarrigo; Innova; Rosales; R2D2; SNTL.
1 4'Able Machine Works; Advanced Telecommunication; Allen; Azam; Bonarrigo; Chesapeake; Edwards;
Fulbright; Hauk; Impeva; Lehman II; Limor; Locke; McZeal; Melech; Ng; Prior; Pro-Pac; Ricoh I; Roll Tide I;
Roll Tide II; R2D2; Saad; Sladky; Sun Capital; Texas Sterling; Torchia; Vaccaro; Weiss. Whether the
causes of action were core or noncore was unclear in SNTL, and the issue was not decided by the district
court when it denied the motion.
1 42Austin; Calderon; Global Aviation; Gold; Grossman; Impeva; Krakowski; Lain; Lehman I; Lemons;
Limor; Logan; Matheny; Needler; New Energy; New Meatco; Nguyen; Ogier; Paulo; Ricoh II; Rosales; Rosen;
Scarcelli; Sladky; SNTL; TPG; T3; UPH I; UPH II; UPH III. Whether the causes of action were core or
noncore was unclear in SNTL, and the issue was not decided by the district court when it denied the
motion.
1 43Advanced Telecommunication; Athos; Bell; Cobe; Field; Ginzburg; Howrey I; Howrey II; Howrey III;
Howrey IV; Howrey V; Howrey VI; Howrey VII; Jemsek; Kirkland; Limor; McCord; Melech; Munoz-Floes;
Roll Tide I; Roll Tide II; Springel I; Springel II; Sun Capital; Torchia; USA United; Weiss; Testramski.
3 44ABC; ABN; Adams; Agile I; Agile II; Archdiocese I; Archdiocese II; Baer; Bagley; Bell Builders; Berg;
Canal Walk; Cary; Chambers; Chance; Country Fare; C.R. Stone; Cushman; Diamond Decision; Diamond
Offshore; Hess; Keba; Kite I; Kite II; LightSquared; Lisenby; Macquarie; Motamedi; Nakamura; Newman;
Panther II; Petrano; PNC Bank; Polverari; Posey; Prevost; Pulsifer I; Pulsifer II; Schroder; Shaffer; Spence;
THQ Villegas; Wagner I; Wagner II; Wagner III. Cf Cyber (case was originally filed in district court and
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follows from the importance of the considerations of uniformity of
bankruptcy administration and efficient use of judicial resources or judicial
economy in determining whether there is cause for withdrawal of the
reference. But it also means that if the camel can get its nose into the tent,
the rest of the body will likely follow. This encourages litigants to file
multiple motions in related cases, particularly if the first motion is successful.
Because a bankruptcy judge cannot conduct a jury trial without the
consent of the parties,3 45 withdrawal of the reference for the purpose of
conducting a jury trial before an Article III judge is mandatory. Although
some district courts in the cases in the study either denied the motion
without prejudice to allow renewal of the motion when the case was ready
for trial, or granted the motion but referred the case back to the bankruptcy
judge for all pretrial matters, the district court withdrew the proceeding
immediately if a jury trial was contemplated in 104 out of 174 cases, 60% of
the time.346 The former two options are substantively identical, with the
exception that a denial without prejudice closes the docket on the district
court case unless and until a new motion is made, while granting the motion
and referring pretrial proceedings back to the bankruptcy court keeps the
civil case open at the district court unless otherwise ordered.34 7 Even when
no litigant has demanded a jury trial, some district courts treat the adversary
proceeding the same way, referring the matter to the bankruptcy court to
manage pretrial proceedings. 348
Of the 104 motions for withdrawal which the district court granted
immediately, forty-five involved fraudulent conveyance claims,349 the type of
claim which is statutorily "core"35 0 and which the bankruptcy court has
substantial experience in handling. District courts should be reluctant to
withdraw the reference so quickly with respect to fraudulent conveyance
claims, even if they are combined with other state law claims, because in
these cases the bankruptcy court has the expertise to handle pretrial matters
referred to bankruptcy court; court granted motion to withdraw reference). But see Roll Tide I; Roll Tide
II; Springel I; Springel II; TPG; T3; UPH I; UPH II; UPH III; Williams I; Williams II; Williams III;
Williams IV; Williams V; Williams VI; Williams VII.
34528 U.S.C. § 157(e).
1 46 This category includes those cases in which all pretrial matters had already been concluded by the
bankruptcy court, so the case was ready for trial.
347See Gowdy; Keba; Macquarie (district court ordered cases administratively closed until pretrial
proceedings completed; cases not reopened a year later).
1 4'See, e.g., Mansmann.
34 9Alabama/Main; Baldi; Bell Builders; Brown; Brown-Minneapolis; Cage; C.R. Stone; Dreier; Gould;
IH; Jubber; LLS I; LLS II; LLS III; LLS IV; LLS V; LLS VI; LLS VII; LLS VIII; LLS IX; LLS X; Marini;
Moglia; Parriott; Pry; Raimondo; Renco; Samson; Sharp; Shengdatech; Steege; Swinson; Vanderpol; Wagner
I; Wagner II; Wagner III; West; Wilenchik; Williams I; Williams II; Williams III; Williams IV; Williams V;
Williams VI; Williams VII.
soSee § 157(b)(2)(H).
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more efficiently than the district court and can submit proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law with respect to dispositive motions in the event
that the proceeding does not settle before trial (which many of them do).
Disposition of Motions to Withdraw Reference in which Jury Trial was Sought
Granted Motion Granted Motion, Denied Motion Denied Motion - No
Immediately Bankruptcy Court to (without Prejudice to Right to Jury Trial
Conduct Pretrial Renew When Ready Established
Proceedings for Trial)
104351 27352 39353 4354
The rate at which district courts in the various circuits withdraw the
reference immediately in cases where a jury trial may ensue (as opposed to
leaving the proceeding with the bankruptcy court for pretrial proceedings)
generally mirrors their respective rates of granting all motions to withdraw,
with the exception of the district courts in the First, Eighth and Eleventh
"Adams; Adventure Harbor; Al Dosari; Alabama/Main; Archdiocese I; Archdiocese II; Arzt; Atlas;
Bagley; Baldi; Barra; Bell Builders; Biesiada; Brown; Brown-Minneapolis; Bullard; Cage; Caillouet; Cary;
Chambers; Chance; Clinica; Compton; CR. Stone; Cruickshank; Cushman; Dreier; Energy Conversion;
Erchonia; Evergreen; Gould; Herendeen; Hess; Hoskins; IES; IH; Innova; Jubber; Kite I; Kite II; Klein; Kretz;
Laikin; LightSquared; LLS I; LLS II; LLS III; LLS IV; LLS V; LLS VI; LLS VII: LLS VIII; LLS IX; LLS
X; Magnificent; Marini; McGuire; McKinstry; Moglia; NMFC; Okechuku; Pal-Con; Panther I; Panther II;
Parker; Parriott; Peterson; Petrano; Plum Creek; Pressman; Pry; Raimondo; Raval; Refco; Renco; SageCrest I;
SageCrest II; Samson; Schroder; Schwab; Seacor; Shaffer; Sharp; Shengdatech; Steege; Swinson; Taicom;
Transcontinental; Vanderpol; Viera; Wagner II; Wagner III; Warren (all pretrial matters were already
concluded); West; Wilenchik; Williams I; Williams II; Williams III; Williams IV; Williams V; Williams VI;
Williams VII; Willson; Winkler.
Adams, Cary, Schroder and Shaffer were related cases involving the bankruptcy of New England
Compounding Pharmacy and were consolidated for trial with many other personal injury tort cases
pending against the debtor and its affiliates in other federal courts. The Adventure Harbor case was
withdrawn for consolidation with another case pending in the district court by the same plaintiff against
the officers of the debtor. The Al Dosari case was originally filed in the district court immediately
following the involuntary bankruptcy filing and without notice of the filing. Atlas was withdrawn
without objection for consolidation with another case pending in the district court. The district court had
previously refused to grant a motion for withdrawal of the reference in Chambers without prejudice for
renewal when the case was ready for trial, but no progress had been made in the bankruptcy court in the
previous two years. The motions in Energy Conversion and Could were the second in the proceeding, the
first having been denied without prejudice until the case was ready for trial and the second coming when
the case was ready for trial.
35 2ABC; ABN; Agile I; Agile II; Berg; Canal Walk; Diamond Offshore; Engelhart; Flaxer; Gowdy;
Hearthwood; H&P; Keba; Macquarie; McKean; Mcloba; Newhouse; Prevost; Scaccianoce; Sojourner;
Spencer; Stettin; SVS; Triad Group; Triad Pharmaceuticals; Villegas; WL Homes.
"Able Machine Works; Advanced Telecommunication; Athos; Azam; Bell; Bonarrigo; Edwards; Field;
Fulbright; Gold; Jemsek (stating that proceeding would be withdrawn when case was ready for trial);
Krakowski; Lain; Limor; Locke; Logan; Matheny; McCord; McZeal; Melech; Munoz-Flores; New Meatco;
Newman; Ng; Ogier; Ricoh I; Roll Tide 1; Roll Tide II; Saad; Springel I; Springel II; Stevenson; Sun Capital;
Torchia; UPH I; UPH II; UPH III; USA United; Testramski. Cf Hauk (denying motion because
bankruptcy court could conduct jury trial with consent of parties).
"Calderon; New Energy; Paulo; Weiss.
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Circuits. District courts in the First and Eighth Circuits granted all their
motions to withdraw the reference immediately in jury trial cases, giving
them a higher percentage of the cases immediately withdrawn. District
courts in the Eleventh Circuit seem to be more reluctant to withdraw jury
trial proceedings immediately than they are to withdraw proceedings in
general.
COMPARISON OF WITHDRAWAL IN ALL CASES AND JURY TRIAL CASES
Circuit 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th
No.and % 7 12 14 13 39 10 14 4 36 14 14
of all 177 4% 7% 8% 7% 22% 6% 8% 2% 20% 8% 8%
motions
granted
No. and % 7355 6356 9357 9358 23359 4360 6361 4362 24363 9364 3365
of all 104 7% 6% 9% 9% 22% 4% 6% 4% 23% 9% 3%
immediate
with-
drawals in
lury cases I I I I_1_11
Unless a proceeding is ready for trial, it is generally a better practice to
deny a motion to withdraw the reference based on a jury trial demand,
without prejudice to its renewal when pretrial proceedings are completed.
Jury trial demands may be made for the strategic reason of buttressing a
motion to withdraw the reference,3 66 and such blatant forum-shopping
should not be encouraged. Moreover, many proceedings will settle before
they actually go to trial, meaning that the district court will never see a
renewed motion to withdraw. If this were the general practice among
s
5 Adams; Atlas; Cary; C.R. Stone; Cruickshank; Schroder; Shaffer.
"Dreer; LightSquared; Refco; Renco; SageCrest I; SageCrest II.
"
71H; Innova; Kretz; Okechuku; Peterson; Pressman; Raval; Schwab; Transcontinental.
"
5 Al Dosari; Arzt; Bell Builders; Bullard; McGuire; NMFC; Plum Creek; Viera; Warren.
"'Adventure Harbor; Alabama/Main; Barra; Biesiada; Brown; Cage; Caillouet; Compton; Erchonia;
Kite I; Kite II; Magnificent; Pal-Con; Parker; Seacor; West; Williams I; Williams II; Williams III; Williams
IV; Williams V; Williams VI; Williams VII.
3
aoChambers; Energy Conversion; Laikin; McKinstry.
1 6'Archdiocese I; Archdiocese II; Baldi; Moglia; Pry; Steege.
36 2Panther I; Panther II; Willson; Winkler.
36 Bagley; Clinica; Cushman; Evergreen; Hoskins; IES; Klein; LLS I; LLS II; LLS IIII; LLS IV; LLS V;
LLS VI; LLS VII; LLS VIII; LLS IX; LLS X; Marini; Parriott; Samson; Sharp; Shengdatech; Taicom;
Wilenchik.
3 6
'Brown-Minneapolis; Chance; Gould; Hess; Jubber; Swinson; Vanderpol; Wagner II; Wagner III.
36 5Herendeen; Petrano; Raimondo.
3 6'See, e.g., In re OCA, Inc., No. 06-3811, 2007 WL 1728914 (E.D. La. June 13, 2007); Superior
Precast, Inc. v. Buckley & Co., No. 97-218, 1998 WL 110594 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 1998); Peachtree Lane
Assocs., Ltd. v. Granader, 175 B.R. 232 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Sender v. Hardie (In re Hedged-Investments
Assocs., Inc.), 153 B.R. 69 (D. Colo. 1993); Markwood Invs. Ltd. v. Neves (In re Neves), 500 B.R. 651
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2013) (making unsuccessful arguments that movant was entitled to jury trial).
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district courts with respect to motions to withdraw the reference for cause,
such motions would not be made quite so frequently.
V. QUESTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
What can we learn from this study? When I undertook this project, I
assumed that I would find both the filing of motions to withdraw the refer-
ence, and the granting of such motions, to be a rare occurrence. I was sur-
prised to find that this is not true.
First, motions to withdraw the reference are made more often than I
anticipated.367 District courts in California lead the nation in withdrawal
motions, followed by those in Texas. Perhaps litigants believe that the dis-
trict courts in those districts will handle their proceedings more quickly than
the bankruptcy courts. Indeed, there is evidence that district courts in the
districts in which the highest number of the motions to withdraw the refer-
ence in the study were filed368 were among the most efficient in the country
in 2013, based on their median time intervals from filing to disposition of civil
cases.3 69  At the same time, the bankruptcy courts in those districts had
among the highest number of adversary proceedings pending in the country in
2013.370 But that certainly cannot be the only explanation because, for exam-
ple, the Northern District of Georgia had a very respectable median time
interval from filing to disposition in 2013 of 6.8 months,3 7' and its bank-
ruptcy judges had 4,451 adversary proceedings pending during 201 3,372 but
only three motions to withdraw the reference was filed and decided in that
317I certainly do not intend to exaggerate the frequency of withdrawal motions. If one looks at the
number of motions to withdraw the reference as a percentage of total adversary proceedings filed in 2013
(although the motions to withdraw were not necessarily filed in the adversary proceedings filed in that
year so the numbers are not completely accurate), the percentages are relatively small, even for the dis.
tricts in which most motions were filed. The highest percentage was in the S.D. Tex. where there were
425 adversary proceedings commenced in 2013, and twenty motions to withdraw on which a decision was
rendered, or 4.7%. Percentages for the other districts in which ten or more motions were filed are smaller:
S.D.N.Y. (13 motions, 1,049 adversaries filed, 1.2%); C.D. Cal. (17 motions, 2,834 adversaries filed, 0.6%);
N.D. Cal. (15 motions, 889 adversaries filed, 1.7%); W.D. Wash. (13 motions, 1,137 adversaries filed,
1.14%); S.D. Fla. (10 motions, 1,007 adversaries filed, 1%). The number of adversary proceedings filed in
2013 was taken from Table F-8, note 99 supra.
368S.D.N.Y. (13 motions); S.D. Tex. (20 motions); C.D. Cal. (17 motions); N.D. Cal. (15 motions); W.
D. Wash. (13 motions); S.D. Fla. (10 motions).
1 69S.D.N.Y. (8.2 months); S.D. Tex. (6.8 months); C.D. Cal. (5.9 months); N.D. Cal. (7.8 months); W.D
Wash. (6.6 months); S.D. Fla. (4.8 months). All, except for the N.D. Cal., are well below the median
intervals for their respective circuits. See Table C-5, U.S. District Courts-Median Time Intervals From
Filing to Disposition of Civil Cases Terminated, by District and Method of Disposition, During the 12.
Month Period Ending December 31, 2013, available at www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/Statisti-
calTablesForTheFederalJudiciary/2013/december/ COSDecl3.pdf.
3 70S.D.N.Y. (5,183); S.D. Tex. (702); C.D. Cal. (3,042); N.D. Cal. (836); W.D. Wash. (781); S.D. Fla.
(1,044). See Table F-8, note 99 supra.
"
1 See Table C-5, note 368 supra.
"
2 See Table F-8, note 99 supra.
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year in that district.3 73
The willingness of district court judges to grant those motions to with-
draw the reference was also unexpected. Courts have suggested that such a
motion should not be granted without "compelling" circumstances.3 74 Con-
gress intended that, as a general matter, bankruptcy cases and proceedings
should be adjudicated in the bankruptcy courts; "cause" for withdrawing
those matters from the bankruptcy court is intended to be read narrowly to
avoid the exception swallowing the rule.3 75 Yet despite the rigor of the stan-
dards for mandatory and permissive withdrawal, the study showed that in
every circuit,3 76 and in almost every district in which four or more motions
were made, 3 77 more motions to withdraw the reference were granted than
denied. Surprisingly, the district courts in California are the least likely to
grant such motions, and still are deluged with more motions to withdraw
than district courts in any other state.
District courts should follow the example of the district courts in Califor-
nia, and apply the requirements for withdrawal of the reference more strictly,
whether or not there is opposition to the motion, and whether or not a jury
trial is demanded. The district courts should certainly grant motions in the
case of mandatory withdrawal, and when an appropriate jury trial demand
has been made and the proceeding is ready for that trial. But in cases where a
motion for permissive withdrawal is made, the district court should consider
that the statutory allocation of responsibility between the district courts and
bankruptcy courts with respect to bankruptcy jurisdiction creates a strong
presumption that a matter should remain in the bankruptcy court unless
there is a compelling reason to withdraw the reference. Congress did not
intend that litigants should be able to choose to move from the bankruptcy
courts to the district courts at their pleasure, even if both parties would
prefer that venue. Nor did Congress mandate immediate withdrawal of the
reference every time a litigant mentions the words "jury trial." If district
courts were more willing to deny motions to withdraw the reference and
take advantage of the experience and diligence of the bankruptcy bench,
1 7'Laddin; Lisenby; Ogier.
374See, e.g., Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Appalachian Fuels, LLC v. Energy Coal
Res., Inc. (In re Appalachian Fuels, LLC), 472 B.R. 731, 737 (E.D. Ky. 2012); U.S. v. Kaplan, 146 B.R. 500,
504 (D. Mass. 1992); Citicorp N. Am., Inc. v. Finley (In re Washington Mfg. Co.), 133 BR. 113, 116
(M.D. Tenn. 1991); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Fifth Third Bank of Columbus (In re Onyx Motor Car
Corp.), 116 BR. 89, 91 (S.D. Ohio 1990); Allard v. Benjamin (In Te DeLorean Motor Co.), 49 B.R. 900,
912 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985).
57
'See, e.g., Kaplan, 146 B.R. at 502-503; Washington Mfg., 133 B.R at 116. Cf. Field v. Lindell (In re
Mortg. Store, Inc.), 464 BR. 421, 428 (D. Hawaii 2011) (finding the standard for permissive withdrawal is
"high").
576See chart at notes 227-247 supra.
377 See chart at notes 256-279 supra.
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fewer litigants would make motions to withdraw the reference, and the bank-
ruptcy system as a whole would operate more efficiently.
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EXHIBIT A
In re Able Machine Works Inc., No. 2:13-cv-05521 (E.D. La. Aug. 21, 2013)
("Able Machine Works")
Adams v. Cadden, No. 1:13-cv-10229 (D. Mass. Feb. 5, 2013) ("Adams")
Advanced Telecomm. Network Inc. v. Flaster/Greenberg, PC, Nos. 8:13-cv-
00993 & 6:13-cv-00700 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 18, 2013) ("Advanced
Telecommunication")
Adventure Harbor Estates, LLC v. Forty Acre Corp., No. 2:13-cv-00142
(E.D. La. Jan. 25, 2013) ("Adventure Harbor")
Al Dosari v. McCormick, No. 1:13-cv-02335 (D. Md. Aug. 9, 2013) ("Al
Dosari")
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